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Abstract
We study optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents when performance eval-
uation is delegated to a reviewer. The reviewer may be biased in favor of the agents,
but the degree of the bias is unknown to the principal. We show that a contest,
which is a contract in which the principal determines a set of prizes to be allocated
to the agents, is optimal. By using a contest, the principal can commit to sustaining
incentives despite the reviewer’s potential leniency bias. The optimal effort profile
can be uniquely implemented by an all-pay auction with a cap, and it can also be im-
plemented by a nested Tullock contest. Our analysis has implications for applications
as diverse as the design of worker compensation, the awarding of research grants, and
the allocation of foreign aid.
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1 Introduction
Principals often lack the information or expertise needed to make appropriate decisions.
A common response to this problem is to delegate the decision to a better informed party.
For example, funding agencies delegate the choice of research projects which will be funded
to an expert committee. Within a firm, the CEO usually delegates to a mid-level manager
the decision regarding the assignment of bonuses to subordinates. Humanitarian aid is
distributed by specialized agencies on behalf of the donor countries.
If the preferences of the principal and the expert who makes the decision are not aligned,
then delegation can lead to distorted decisions. The principal can attempt to influence the
decision by limiting the set of outcomes from which the expert can select. The existing
literature on optimal delegation studies how this delegation set should be designed.1 In
these papers, the principal wants to base her decision on some stochastic state of nature,
the value of which is known only to the expert. Crucially, this state of nature is assumed
to be exogenous. However, in the examples above, the state of nature (the quality of
research projects, the performance of employees, the cooperativeness of receiving countries)
is determined in part in anticipation of the decision that the expert will make. As a matter
of fact, the goal of the principal is exactly to incentivize the agents to exert effort. For
example, the goal of the funding agencies is to stimulate creation of high quality research.
Similarly, bonuses in firms are instruments that incentivize employees to work hard, and
aid is in part allocated to bring about reforms.
In this paper, we study the optimal delegation problem for performance evaluation. A
principal wishes to incentivize agents to exert costly effort. The efforts are not observable
to the principal. However, an expert, which we will from now on refer to as the reviewer, can
costlessly observe the exerted efforts.2 The principal thus delegates the decision on how to
reward the agents to the reviewer, but possibly restricts the set of allowable decisions. The
reviewer’s preferences may not be perfectly aligned with the principal. While the reviewer
takes into account the effect of his actions on the principal’s payoff, maybe because he
owns shares of the company or he cares intrinsically, he may also care about the agents.
For instance, as we will discuss below, there is ample evidence that managers care about
the payoffs of their subordinates. Exactly how much the reviewer cares about the agents
is the reviewer’s private information. Importantly, a reviewer who cares sufficiently much
about the agents will be reluctant to punish them even if they do not exert sufficient effort.
Anticipating this, the agents will exert less effort. The principal thus has to design the
delegation set in a way that restricts the scope of possible leniency of the reviewer.
1See, for example, Holmström (1977, 1984), Melumad and Shibano (1991), Alonso and Matouschek
(2008), Armstrong and Vickers (2010), Amador and Bagwell (2013), and Frankel (2014).
2We do not consider the problem of incentivizing the reviewer to exert costly effort in order to learn
the state of nature. This is an interesting but distinct incentive problem which is studied in Aghion and
Tirole (1997), Strausz (1997), Szalay (2005), Rahman (2012), and Pei (2015b).
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One could also imagine that the principal tries to correct the distortions by paying
transfers to the reviewer conditional on the action that he takes. However, contingent
transfers are often not observed in reality. Committees deciding which research projects
get funded are not paid conditional on how many projects they approve or reject. Mid-
level managers do not get paid differently depending on how they allocate bonuses among
their subordinates. In fact, paying an expert for performing a particular evaluation is often
referred to as a conflict of interest and is explicitly forbidden. The delegation approach,
which rules out direct monetary incentives, is therefore particularly plausible for our setting
of performance evaluation.3
Our first main result is that a contest among the agents is an optimal delegation mech-
anism. That is, the principal defines a set of prizes and the reviewer only decides how to
allocate these prizes to the agents. The reviewer does not have the additional freedom to
choose the overall size or the split of the agents’ compensation. This strongly limits the
degree of leniency he can exercise. In particular, the reviewer is always forced to punish
some agents by assigning them a small prize, which is crucial for the preservation of in-
centives. Without this commitment, the reviewer would be lenient and the agents would
shirk. The downside of the contest mechanism is that a small prize has to be assigned (at
random) even when all agents provide the sufficient level of effort. When the agents are
risk-averse, this will be inefficient.
This result is interesting for several reasons. First, contests are a commonly used
and often-studied incentive scheme, and much work has been devoted to their optimal
design.4 There is, however, not much work on the more general question whether and
under which conditions contests are actually optimal mechanisms.5 Exceptions are the
seminal paper of Lazear and Rosen (1981), as well as papers which stress that contests can
filter out common shocks when agents are risk-averse (Green and Stokey, 1983; Nalebuff
and Stiglitz, 1983) or ambiguity-averse (Kellner, 2015). In our model, an important reason
for contests to be optimal is that they act as a commitment device. A contest provides two
types of commitment. It commits the principal to the announced prizes and thus prevents
manipulation of the sum of payments made to the agents. The literature has observed
previously that this “commitment to pay” can be beneficial when the agents’ efforts are
3The absence of monetary transfers in delegation mechanisms mirrors the incentive structure assumed
in models of cheap talk (Crawford and Sobel, 1982) or bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow,
2011). Another instrument that the delegation approach rules out in our setting is the possibility of direct
communication between the principal and the agents.
4For instance, Glazer and Hassin (1988) and Moldovanu and Sela (2001) study the design of prizes for
a given contest success function. Jia, Skaperdas, and Vaidya (2013) survey papers that study the design
of a contest success function for given prizes.
5Prendergast (1999, p. 36) writes: “Rather surprisingly, there is very little work devoted to understand-
ing why this is the case, i.e., why the optimal means of providing incentives within large firms (at least
for white-collar workers) seems to be tournaments rather than the other means suggested in the previous
sections.” We find this still to be the case in the years since Prendergast published his paper.
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not verifiable. For instance, Malcomson (1984, 1986) argues that piece-rate contracts are
not credible in that case, as the principal would always claim low performance ex post in
order to reduce payments, while a contest remains credible.6 However, this credibility can
also be achieved by simply committing to a total sum of payments without setting fixed
prizes. In fact, as we will show, such a scheme would outperform a contest when the agents
are risk-averse, by removing uncertainty from equilibrium payments.7 Hence the second
type of commitment, the above described “commitment to punish,” is crucial in explaining
the optimality of contests with fixed prizes.8 Second, a contest is a remarkably simple
mechanism. Even though we allow for arbitrary stochastic delegation mechanisms with
possibly sophisticated transfer rules, the optimum can be achieved by a simple mechanism
characterized by a prize profile and a suggestion how to distribute the prizes in response to
the agents’ efforts. The principal does not attempt to screen the reviewer’s type, in spite
of the fact that the first-best may be achievable if the type were known to the principal.
This makes the strategic considerations of the agents simple. In particular, their behavior
does not depend on beliefs regarding the reviewer’s type. This robustness property is
important because principal and agents may well have different beliefs (for instance, in
the example with managers allocating bonuses, it seems reasonable to assume that the
employees working directly with a manager have more precise information about their
manager’s type than a CEO does).
Our second result characterizes the prize structure of an optimal contest. Given n
agents, an optimal contest will have n− 1 equal positive prizes and one zero prize. Thus,
while the contest acts as a commitment to punish, the punishment is kept at the minimum
required to incentivize effort. The delegation set forces the reviewer to allocate a zero prize
to only one agent, so that the optimal contest exhibits a “loser-takes-nothing” rather than a
“winner-takes-all” structure. In equilibrium, when all agents have provided sufficient effort,
the reviewer randomly chooses the agent who receives the zero prize. Thus all agents are
facing the same risk. If agents are risk-averse, they respond to this risk by reducing the
amount of effort they are willing to exert. A corollary of this result is that the first-best
6Similarly, Carmichael (1983) considers a setting where the final output is verifiable but depends on
the efforts of both the principal and the agents. With a contract that pays agents based on total output,
the principal has an incentive to reduce own effort in order to reduce the payments to agents.
7Levin (2002) shows that a constant sum of payments arises in equilibrium of a repeated game, where
the principal’s wage promises have to be self-enforcing. A contest-type compensation structure arises in
an optimal equilibrium only if the agents are risk-neutral.
8The problem of committing to punishment is related to Konrad (2001) and Netzer and Scheuer (2010).
They study the problem of a planner who would like to implement redistribution after agents have chosen
their actions, the anticipation of which may destroy incentives to choose costly but socially desirable
actions. In the context of optimal income taxation, Konrad (2001) shows that private information about
labor productivity provides a commitment against excessive redistribution. In the context of insurance
and labor markets, Netzer and Scheuer (2010) show that adverse selection provides a commitment by
generating separating market equilibria. In both cases, agents who choose socially less desirable actions
are punished by having to forego information rents.
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is implementable if and only if the agents are risk-neutral. We also show that an optimal
contest implements an outcome close to the first-best if the agents’ risk-aversion is moderate
or the number of agents is large.
Our third result shows that a familiar all-pay auction with a cap implements the opti-
mum, and it does so in unique equilibrium.9 As in a standard all-pay auction with n − 1
identical prizes, the agent with the lowest effort receives the zero prize, and ties are broken
randomly. However, efforts are capped at the desired equilibrium level. This removes the
possibility for the agents to exert slightly more than the equilibrium effort in order to guar-
antee themselves a positive prize with probability one. In addition to the all-pay auction,
we show as our fourth result that the optimum can also be achieved with an imperfectly
discriminating contest, such as the well-known Tullock contest. The Tullock-type contest
success function arises endogenously as part of an optimal contract in our analysis. In
summary, the optimum can be achieved with several of the commonly studied formats of
contests (see Konrad, 2009). This shows that the essential feature of our main result is the
fixed profile of prizes, and not the exact form of the contest success function.
We then consider extensions where the reviewer only imperfectly observes individual
efforts of the agents. We show that, by using stochastic allocation rules, the principal
can often still implement the optimal allocation with a contest. Next, we discuss how our
analysis can be extended to settings with non-separable preferences and favoritism of the
reviewer. We also generalize the model to allow for heterogeneous effort cost functions and
show that our main results remain robust. Finally, we consider a model of cheap talk with
limited commitment (see Kolotilin, Li, and Li, 2013) where the reviewer does not make the
allocation decision but communicates the observed effort levels to the principal. We again
show that our results for the delegation model continue to hold in the cheap talk model.
Our contribution is related to three strands of literature: on the optimality of contests,
on biased reviewers, and on optimal delegation. A more detailed discussion of this literature
is postponed to Section 5. A closely related paper is Frankel (2014). Like in our paper,
he considers a multidimensional delegation problem with uncertainty about the expert’s
preferences. He assumes that the state of the world is exogenous and not affected by the
choice of the delegation mechanism. In contrast, our prime concern is how the delegation
mechanism affects the state of the world, i.e., how it provides incentives for agents to
exert effort. Another difference is that Frankel (2014) derives max-min mechanisms, which
are optimal for the worst possible realization of the expert’s bias, while we are interested
in mechanisms that maximize the principal’s expected payoff given her beliefs about the
expert’s type. Frankel (2014) shows that, when the set of possible preferences of the expert
9As we will explain in Section 3, uniqueness only refers to the agents’ choice of efforts in the given
contest. The reviewer will be indifferent among several actions, and in particular a “babbling” equilibrium
exists where his assignment of prizes is unresponsive to the agents’ efforts and they exert zero effort.
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is rich enough, a ranking mechanism is max-min optimal. When the multidimensional
state of the world is an effort profile, like in our setting, this ranking mechanism would
correspond to a standard all-pay auction (see Siegel, 2009, for a general treatment of
contests with all-pay structure). Such an all-pay auction without a cap is not optimal
in our setting with endogenous efforts, but there is a range of different contests that are
optimal. Furthermore, since the principal’s payoff turns out to be independent of the
reviewer’s type in these optimal contests, they not only maximize expected payoffs but are
also max-min optimal. Another closely related paper is Strausz (1997), who considers the
delegation of performance evaluation for a single agent. Monitoring is costly and produces
verifiable signals in his setting. Strausz (1997) shows that delegation generates optimal
incentives for costly monitoring and the disclosure of signals.
Our model applies to many situations where a principal wants to incentivize agents
but cannot directly supervise them. Here we will discuss two possible applications, which
are meant to illustrate the range and scale of our model. One application is the design of
performance evaluation schemes in firms. The performance evaluation scheme is designed
by the CEO, but the CEO does not observe the individual efforts of the employees to
which the scheme applies. Hence, the actual performance evaluation is delegated to the
employees’ supervisor. By virtue of working closely with the employees, the supervisor
observes their efforts but also cares about their payoffs. There is ample evidence (both
empirical and experimental) that supervisors tend to be too lenient when judging the
performance of their subordinates, and that the degree of leniency varies and depends
on (among other things) social ties between the supervisor and the team.10 Our results
have direct implications for the controversial debate over the use of the so-called “forced
rankings,” a review system which was most famously used by General Electric under Jack
Welch during their fast growth in the 1980s and 90s.11 Our contribution to this discussion
is (i) to show that forced rankings are optimal for motivating effort under the assumptions
of our model, (ii) to show how optimal forced rankings should be constructed, and (iii)
to show that some elements of forced rankings which are usually criticized are actually
necessary for incentivizing effort. In particular, forced rankings are criticized for forcing
managers to assign low rankings even when all workers are performing well: “What happens
if you’re working with a superstar team? You’ve just forced a distribution that doesn’t
10For example, Bol (2011) and Breuer, Nieken, and Sliwka (2013) find evidence of leniency bias which
depends on the strength of the employee-manager relationship. Bol (2011) cites studies documenting
leniency bias going back to the 1920s, while citations to similar findings in the 1940s can be found in
Prendergast (1999). Berger, Harbring, and Sliwka (2013) find experimental evidence of leniency bias,
and Bernardin, Cooke, and Villanova (2000) document that the degree of leniency bias in an experiment
depends on personality traits of the reviewer. More generally, Cappelen, Hole, Sørensen, and Tungodden
(2007) show experimentally that individuals exhibit a variety of different fairness preferences.
11For example, see “’Rank and Yank’ Retains Vocal Fans” (L. Kwoh, The Wall Street Journal, January
31, 2012) and “For Whom the Bell Curve Tolls” (J. McGregor, The Washington Post, November 20, 2013).
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exist. You create this stupid world where [great] people are punished.”12 Similarly, Brad
Smart who worked with Jack Welch on developing GE’s forced ranking system criticized
GE’s decision to assign 10% of the workers a low evaluation: “To force those distributions
when the percentages don’t meet the reality is nuts.”13 Our results show that, far from
being “stupid” or “nuts,” not rewarding some workers even when they perform well is
necessary, since if the managers were given an option to reward all workers, they may
choose it irrespective of actual performance, which would destroy any incentive effect of
the evaluation system.
A very different situation for which our model offers insights is foreign aid. Donors have
been trying for decades to use foreign aid to incentivize reforms in recipient countries, but
there is little empirical evidence that it has been effective (see e.g. Easterly, 2003; Rajan
and Subramanian, 2008). In response, funding agencies and governments have tried to
improve mechanisms for the allocation of foreign aid in ways that link aid to improvement
in governance and other policy reforms. One early approach has been the so-called “condi-
tional aid,” where donors promise to withdraw future aid if the agreed policy reforms have
not been achieved. However, the donors’ threats to withdraw aid were not credible and,
unsurprisingly, reforms were usually not carried out. As Easterly (2009) somewhat amus-
ingly points out, the World Bank conditioned aid on the same agricultural policy reform in
Kenya five separate times – and the conditions were violated each time. Svensson (2003)
proposes a solution to this problem. Instead of allocating the budget for each country sepa-
rately, similar countries could be pooled together and the total budget for all these countries
could be allocated to a single aid officer. This way, if one country does not reform, the
aid officer has the option of reallocating the aid from that country to another. Our paper
points to a potential problem with this approach and offers a solution. A benevolent aid
officer may still be tempted to split the aid more or less equally among the countries, their
efforts towards reform notwithstanding. Our paper suggests that holding a contest among
recipient countries can overcome this problem. That is, instead of giving the aid officer full
discretion over the total budget for multiple countries, the budget could be partitioned into
fixed “prizes” that the officer allocates to the countries. Obviously, it may be politically
difficult to implement a contest where a country receives zero aid even if it invested effort
in reforms. However, some variant of our mechanism, where all countries receive aid but
some countries receive “bonus aid” through a contest might be both politically feasible and
desirable from the incentive point of view.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. In
Section 3 we show that the set of optimal contracts contains a contest, we characterize
12Quote of a management adviser in “For Whom the Bell Curve Tolls” (J. McGregor, The Washington
Post, November 20, 2013).
13In “’Rank and Yank’ Retains Vocal Fans” (L. Kwoh, The Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2012).
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all optimal contests, and we deal with different implementations of the optimal outcome.
In Section 4 we develop several extensions of the baseline model. Section 5 contains a
discussion of the related literature, and Section 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated to
Appendices A and B.
2 The Model
2.1 Environment
A principal contracts with a set of agents I = {1, ..., n} where n ≥ 2. Each agent i ∈ I
chooses an effort level ei ≥ 0 and obtains a monetary transfer ti ≥ 0. The agents have an
outside option of zero. The payoff of agent i is given by
pii(ei, ti) = u(ti)− c(ei).
The utility function u : R+ → R is twice differentiable, strictly increasing, weakly concave,
and satisfies u(0) = 0. The cost function c : R+ → R is twice differentiable, strictly
increasing, strictly convex, and satisfies c(0) = 0, c′(0) = 0, and limei→∞ c′(ei) = ∞. The
assumption of additive separability of transfers and efforts is standard in contract theory,
mechanism design, and contest theory. We will discuss the robustness of our results with
respect to non-separable and also asymmetric preferences in Section 4.
We denote effort profiles by e = (e1, ..., en) ∈ E and transfer profiles by t = (t1, ..., tn) ∈
T . We assume that E = Rn+ and T = {t ∈ Rn+ |
∑n
i=1 ti ≤ T¯}, where T¯ > 0 can be
arbitrarily large. Our results hold no matter whether T¯ is eventually binding or not. The
payoff of the principal from an allocation (e, t) is
piP (e, t) = z(e)−
n∑
i=1
ti,
where z : E → R+ is interpreted as the production function that converts efforts into
output. For clarity of exposition we will focus only on the case where z(e) =
∑n
i=1 ei. Our
main results continue to hold if we assume more generally that z is symmetric, weakly
concave, and strictly increasing in each of its arguments.
Example. We will use a parameterized example to illustrate our results throughout the
paper. In this example, each of the n agents has the payoff function
pii(ei, ti) = t
α
i − γeβi ,
where 0 < α ≤ 1 parameterizes risk-aversion, β > 1 describes the degree of cost convexity,
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and γ > 0 determines the relative weight of effort costs. We will always assume that T¯
is large enough to be non-binding in the example. The first-best effort level eFB is what
the principal would demand from each agent if she could perfectly control effort and would
only have to compensate the agent for his cost, thus paying tFB = u−1(c(eFB)). In our
example, maximization of e− u−1(c(e)) yields
eFB =
(
α
βγ1/α
) α
β−α
and tFB =
(
α
βγ1/β
) β
β−α
.
The principal’s first-best profit is n(eFB − tFB). 
The effort exerted by the agents is not verifiable to outside parties (e.g. a court) and
is not observable to the principal. However, the efforts can be observed by a reviewer.
Consequently, the evaluation of the agents’ performance and the decision on how to reward
the agents are delegated to the reviewer. In line with the literature on delegation, we
assume that the principal does not pay the reviewer based on the decision made (but can
in principle pay a fixed fee to the reviewer, which we normalize to zero). Specifically, the
payoff of the reviewer from an allocation (e, t) is given by
piR(e, t, θ) = piP (e, t) + θ
n∑
i=1
pii(e, t),
where θ is a parameter that captures how much the reviewer cares about the well-being
of the agents, and thus by how much the reviewer’s preferences are misaligned with those
of the principal. The parameter θ can be thought of as a fundamental preference or as
a reduced-form representation of concerns due to other interactions with the agents. We
assume that θ is private information of the reviewer, observable neither to the principal nor
to the agents. It is drawn according to a commonly known continuous distribution with
full support on Θ = [θ, θ¯], where θ < θ¯. We describe this distribution by an (absolutely
continuous) probability measure τ over Θ. Our results will be independent of the shape
as well as the location of this distribution. In particular, τ could be arbitrarily close to a
probability measure with atoms, and our results would also continue to hold if the support
Θ was a union of countably many disjoint intervals.
2.2 Implementation with Credible Contracts
The timing is as follows. First, the principal delegates the evaluation and remuneration
of the agents to the reviewer by designing a set D of possible actions. An action is a
probability measure µ ∈ ∆T on the set of transfer profiles, describing the potentially
stochastic payments made to the agents. Given the delegation set, the agents choose their
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efforts simultaneously. The reviewer then observes the efforts (and his type) and chooses
an action from D to reward or punish the agents.14
Since e and θ are observable only to the reviewer, he is always free to choose any action
that he prefers. We model this by defining a contract Φ = (µe,θ)(e,θ)∈E×Θ as a collection of
probability measures µe,θ ∈ ∆T , one for each (e, θ) ∈ E×Θ. The interpretation is that the
principal suggests that a reviewer of type θ should reward an effort profile e by transfers
according to µe,θ.15 The following incentive constraint makes sure that the reviewer indeed
has an incentive to follow this suggestion:
ΠR(e, µ
e,θ, θ) ≥ ΠR(e, µe′,θ′ , θ) ∀(e, θ), (e′, θ′) ∈ E ×Θ, (IC-R)
where
ΠR(e, µ
e′,θ′ , θ) = Eµe′,θ′
[
piP (e, t) + θ
n∑
i=1
pii(ei, ti)
]
.
We say that a contract Φ is credible if it satisfies (IC-R). Given a credible contract, the
delegation set is implicitly given by D = {µ ∈ ∆T | ∃(e, θ) s.t. µ = µe,θ}.
Denote by σi ∈ ∆R+ agent i’s mixed strategy for his effort provision. We also write
ei ∈ ∆R+ for Dirac measures that represent pure strategies. Strategy profiles are given by
σ = (σ1, ..., σn) ∈ (∆R+)n. We also use σ to denote the induced product measure in ∆E.
We say a contract Φ implements a strategy profile σ if it is credible and satisfies
Πi((σi, σ−i),Φ) ≥ Πi((σ′i, σ−i),Φ) ∀σ′i ∈ ∆R+, ∀i ∈ I, (IC-A)
where
Πi(σ,Φ) = Eσ
[
Eτ
[
Eµe,θ [u(ti)]
]]− Eσi [c(ei)] .
Since a deviation to an effort of zero always guarantees each agent a payoff of at least zero,
14A different timing would be that the reviewer observes his type already before he interacts with the
agents and observes their efforts. In that case, the principal could offer a menu of delegation sets from
which the reviewer selects one before observing the agents’ efforts. Our results are robust to this different
timing provided that the reviewer’s selection of a delegation set is not observable to the agents. If it was
observable, additional signalling issues would arise, because the agents may coordinate on different effort
profiles contingent on the reviewer’s observable action. We refrain from studying these issues here, but we
remark that, even in that case, the additional gain (if any) from a more complicated mechanism is limited
if the agents’ risk-aversion is moderate or the number of agents is large (see Section 4).
15This formulation does not preclude the possibility that a reviewer randomizes over actions, because
the randomization over probability measures can instead be written as a compound measure that is chosen
with probability one. We impose the following regularity condition on contracts: for each measurable set
A ⊆ T , µe,θ(A) is a measurable function of (e, θ). This ensures that expected payoffs are well-defined in
contracts.
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the agents’ participation constraints can henceforth be ignored.16
The principal maximizes her expected payoff by choosing a contract Φ to implement
some strategy profile σ. Formally, the principal’s problem is given by
max
(σ,Φ)
ΠP (σ,Φ) s.t. (IC-R), (IC-A), (P)
where
ΠP (σ,Φ) = Eσ
[
n∑
i=1
ei
]
− Eσ
[
Eτ
[
Eµe,θ
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]]]
.
A contract Φ∗ is optimal if there exists σ∗ such that (σ∗,Φ∗) solves (P).
Finally, we introduce a specific class of contracts that will be referred to as contests. A
contest is described by a collection of prizes and a contest success function. Put differently,
a contest commits to a profile of prizes y = (y1, ..., yn) ∈ T , some of which could be zero,
and specifies how these prizes are allocated to the n agents as a function of their efforts.
More formally, let P (y) denote the set of permutations of y.17 Then a contest Cy with
prize profile y is a contract that satisfies (i) µe,θ(P (y)) = 1 for all (e, θ) ∈ E ×Θ, and (ii)
µe,θ = µe,θ
′ for all θ, θ′ ∈ Θ and e ∈ E. This formulation includes all common contests,
such as all-pay auctions and Tullock contests.
Note that every contest is credible. This is because, once the agents’ efforts are sunk,
any permutation of the prizes generates the same payoff for the principal and the same
sum of utilities for the agents. Formally, in any contest Cy we obtain that
ΠR(e, µ
e′,θ′ , θ) =
n∑
i=1
ei −
n∑
i=1
yi + θ
(
n∑
i=1
u(yi)−
n∑
i=1
c(ei)
)
is independent of (e′, θ′). However, the set of credible contracts is substantially larger than
the set of contests. For instance, it is possible to select from a much larger set of transfer
profiles, not just permutations of a given prize profile, and still keep both the expected
sum of transfers and the expected sum of the agents’ utilities constant (see Section 4 for
an example). Furthermore, credible contracts do not have to be independent of θ but can
screen different reviewer types.
16Formally, constraints (IC-R) and (IC-A) characterize Perfect Bayesian equilibria of the following game.
Given a delegation set D, the agents first simultaneously choose their efforts e. Nature then determines the
reviewer’s type θ. The reviewer finally observes e and θ and chooses from D. Constraint (IC-R) prescribes
sequential rationality for the reviewer’s (singleton) information sets, while (IC-A) prescribes sequential
rationality (with weakly consistent beliefs) for the information sets in which the agents choose.
17Profile t is a permutation of y if there exists a bijective mapping s : I → I such that ti = ys(i) ∀i ∈ I.
11
3 Optimal Contracts
3.1 The Optimality of Contests
To illustrate the key incentive problem in our model, suppose first that the preference
parameter θ was known to the principal and the agents. The following example shows
that, in this case, there may exist a credible contract which is not a contest but which
implements the first-best effort levels and extracts the entire surplus.
Example. Consider our previous example for the special case of n = 2. Suppose the
reviewer’s type was common knowledge. First assume θ = 0, so that there is also no
misalignment of preferences between the principal and the reviewer. Consider a contract
ΦFB where, if both agents exert eFB, each of them is paid tFB. If one agent deviates,
that agent is paid 0 while the non-deviating agent is paid 2tFB. In case both agents
deviate, they are again each paid tFB. It is easy to verify that this contract is credible,
because the sum of transfers is constant across (tFB, tFB), (2tFB, 0) and (0, 2tFB), which
makes the reviewer indifferent between these transfer profiles. It is also easy to verify
that this contract implements (eFB, eFB), because both agents receive a payoff of zero in
equilibrium and a payoff of at most zero after any unilateral deviation. Thus the first-best
is achievable. Observe that ΦFB is not a contest, because the three transfer profiles are
not all permutations of each other. We will show in Section 3.2 that the first-best is not
achievable by a contest if the agents are risk-averse. Hence, ΦFB performs strictly better
than any contest in this example. This shows that non-verifiability of effort alone does not
make contests optimal.18
Now assume that θ > 0 and adjust the contract ΦFB as follows. The payment 2tFB to
a non-deviating agent is replaced by some tnd, while everything else is kept unchanged. If
tnd is chosen such that the reviewer is indifferent between the transfer profiles (tFB, tFB),
(tnd, 0), and (0, tnd), credibility is restored and the first-best can be implemented. For
instance, with α = 1/2, β = 2, and γ = 1 we have eFB ≈ 0.63 and tFB ≈ 0.16. For a
reviewer of known type θ = 3 we would then obtain tnd ≈ 1.15.19 This shows that the
misalignment of preferences per se does not make contests optimal either. 
The contracts described in the example no longer work if θ is the reviewer’s private
information. Just consider the optimal contract for type θ = 0. Any reviewer with type
18The argument is related to MacLeod (2003), who considers an environment with a principal, a single
agent, and non-verifiable performance signals. He shows that, if the principal can commit to an unbalanced
budget, she can credibly punish a shirking agent. In our example, the transfer to the non-deviating agent
resolves the budget surplus problem.
19The indifference condition is −2tFB + θ2u(tFB) = −tnd + θu(tnd). Given our parameters, it has a
second solution tnd ≈ 3.72, which would work as well. Note that the indifference condition is not guaranteed
to have a solution for all parameter values, so our simple construction of a first-best contract does not
work for all values of θ > 0.
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θ′ > 0 will strictly prefer to allocate (tFB, tFB), no matter what efforts the agents have
exerted. This illustrates the leniency bias and the need for commitment.
Our first main result shows that, despite the fact that the set of possible contracts is
very large, optimal contracts with uncertainty about θ take a very simple form.
Theorem 1 The set of optimal contracts contains a contest.
We will establish Theorem 1 by proving a series of six lemmas. Since we have shown
that the principal may be able to implement the first-best if she knew the reviewer’s private
type θ, it would seem reasonable to expect that the principal could benefit from screening
these types. In fact, it is not difficult to construct contracts that screen the reviewer’s
type, by varying the sum of transfers and the sum of utilities given to the agents. However,
Lemmas 1 - 3 below demonstrate that it is not possible for the principal to benefit from
screening. Lemmas 4 - 5 then show that the principal cannot benefit from implementing
mixed or asymmetric effort profiles. Finally, Lemma 6 shows that using contests is without
loss of generality.
To begin with, we fix an arbitrary contract Φ = (µe,θ)(e,θ)∈E×Θ and denote
St(e, θ) = Eµe,θ
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
, Su(e, θ) = Eµe,θ
[
n∑
i=1
u(ti)
]
and
S(e, θ) = −St(e, θ) + θSu(e, θ).
We can then rewrite the credibility constraint (IC-R) as
−St(e, θ) + θSu(e, θ) ≥ −St(e′, θ′) + θSu(e′, θ′) ∀(e, θ), (e′, θ′) ∈ E ×Θ.
Our first lemma provides a characterization of this multidimensional constraint.
Lemma 1 A contract Φ is credible if and only if the conditions (i) - (iii) hold:
(i) ∀θ ∈ Θ, S(e, θ) = S(e′, θ) ∀e, e′ ∈ E.
(ii) ∀e ∈ E, Su(e, θ) is non-decreasing in θ.
(iii) ∀e ∈ E, S(e, θ) = S(e, θ) + ∫ θ
θ
Su(e, s)ds ∀θ ∈ Θ.
Conditions (ii) and (iii) are familiar from the mechanism design literature. They have
to hold separately for each fixed effort profile e. Condition (i) concerns the effort dimension
and shows that the payoff of any reviewer has to be constant for any reported e.
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Given the characterization provided by Lemma 1, the next lemma states an important
implication of the credibility constraint. Not only does S(e, θ) have to be constant across
different profiles e, also its constituent parts St(e, θ) and Su(e, θ) cannot vary with e.
Lemma 2 A contract Φ is credible only if there exists a pair of functions x : Θ→ R+ and
xˆ : Θ→ R+ such that, ∀e ∈ E,
St(e, θ) = x(θ), Su(e, θ) = xˆ(θ)
for almost all θ ∈ Θ.
We now show that there is no gain for the principal from screening the reviewer’s private
type by using a complex contract where µe,θ varies with θ. Put differently, the principal
can without loss of generality design the delegation set in a way such that all reviewers
select the same actions.
Lemma 3 For every contract Φ that implements a strategy profile σ, there exists a contract
Φˆ that also implements σ, yields the same expected payoff to the principal, and, ∀θ, θ′ ∈ Θ,
satisfies µˆe,θ = µˆe,θ′ ∀e ∈ E.
The proof of the lemma is constructive and shows how the contract Φˆ without screening
can be obtained from an arbitrary contract Φ. Given this result, we from now on focus
without loss of generality on contracts where the agents’ transfers depend on their efforts
only, which we write as Φ = (µe)e∈E. The next lemma shows that the principal does not
benefit from implementing mixed strategies.
Lemma 4 For every contract Φ that implements a strategy profile σ, there exists a contract
Φˆ that implements the pure-strategy profile e¯ = (e¯1, ..., e¯n), where e¯i = Eσi [ei] ∀i ∈ I, and
yields the same expected payoff to the principal.
The intuition behind this result is simple: any randomness in transfers that is achieved
by mixed strategies can equivalently be generated by the contract. On the other hand,
since c is convex, the agents benefit from exerting the average effort e¯i instead of σi,
while the principal is indifferent as to whether she obtains the efforts in expectation or
deterministically.
The next lemma states that, in the current symmetric setting, it is without loss to
restrict attention to the implementation of symmetric effort profiles.
Lemma 5 For every contract Φ that implements a pure-strategy profile e¯ = (e¯1, ..., e¯n),
there exists a contract Φˆ that implements the symmetric pure-strategy profile eˆ = (eˆ1, ..., eˆn),
where eˆ1 = . . . = eˆn = 1n
∑n
i=1 e¯i, and yields the same expected payoff to the principal.
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The next lemma completes the proof of Theorem 1 by demonstrating that the principal
can achieve the same payoff with a contest as with any non-screening contract that imple-
ments a symmetric pure-strategy effort profile. Thus, the principal can obtain her maximal
payoff with a contest.20
Lemma 6 For every contract Φ that implements a symmetric pure-strategy profile eˆ, there
exists a contest Cy that also implements eˆ and yields the same expected payoff to the prin-
cipal.
To prove this lemma, we construct a contest which implements the effort profile eˆ. This
contest features n − 1 identical prizes and one prize that is smaller. The small prize is
used to punish agents who deviate in either direction from eˆ. In equilibrium, when the
effort profile eˆ is realized, the small prize is allocated randomly among the agents. As we
will show in the next section, this particular prize structure is a general feature of optimal
contests, while the specific (non-monotonic) allocation rule is not required to achieve the
optimum.
3.2 Optimal Contests
From the previous section, we know that the principal can restrict attention to contests
when designing an optimal contract. In this section, we characterize general features of all
optimal contests. When describing a contest Cy, in the following we always assume w.l.o.g.
that the prize profile y is ordered such that y1 ≥ y2 ≥ . . . ≥ yn.
Theorem 2 A contest is optimal if and only if the conditions (i) and (ii) hold:
(i) The prizes satisfy yn = 0 and
∑n
k=1 yk = x
∗, with x∗ = min{x¯, T¯} and x¯ given by
u′
(
x¯
n− 1
)
= c′
(
c−1
(
n− 1
n
u
(
x¯
n− 1
)))
.
If the agents are risk-averse, then the prize profile is unique and given by
y = (x∗/(n− 1), . . . , x∗/(n− 1), 0).
(ii) The contest implements (e∗, . . . , e∗), where e∗ is given by
e∗ = c−1
(
n− 1
n
u
(
x∗
n− 1
))
.
20To be exact, Theorem 1 follows only after it has been shown that problem (P) has a solution, so that
an optimal contract exists. This will be shown in the proof of Theorem 2 in the next section.
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Condition (i) in the theorem shows that the lowest prize will be zero in any optimal
contest. This is not obvious, since the agents can be risk-averse and in equilibrium all
agents face the risk of receiving the zero prize. The intuition is that in equilibrium an
agent receives the zero prize with probability 1/n, while a shirking agent would receive the
zero prize with strictly larger probability (possibly one). Thus, any increase in yn decreases
the difference between the equilibrium and the deviation payoffs, and therefore decreases
the amount of effort that can be demanded in equilibrium. When the agents are risk-averse,
the optimal prize profile will feature n− 1 identical positive prizes in addition to the zero
prize, which keeps the risk imposed on the agents in equilibrium at a minimum. This prize
structure is not novel but has been found to be optimal in different settings (e.g. Glazer
and Hassin, 1988; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983). We also characterize the optimal total prize
sum x∗, which is given by the point x¯ where marginal cost and benefit of inducing effort
are equalized, or by the exogenous budget T¯ whenever it is sufficiently tight.
Condition (ii) in the theorem shows that every optimal contest extracts the entire
surplus from the agents, because it implements a symmetric pure-strategy effort profile
such that each agent’s equilibrium payoff is zero. This condition puts limits on the set
of possible contest success functions which can be used to achieve the optimum. We will
explore these limits in the following subsections.
Having characterized the optimal contests, we turn to the question of efficiency loss.
Corollary 1 If the agents are risk-neutral, the principal can achieve the first-best. If the
agents are risk-averse, the principal cannot achieve the first-best.
The efficiency loss is driven entirely by risk-aversion of the agents. The loss is a direct
consequence of the necessity to assign a prize of zero. Since the principal has to commit
to the low prize, it must be delivered even in equilibrium. Risk-averse agents have to be
compensated for this, which increases the cost of inducing effort. Hence, the commitment
problem prevents the principal from achieving the first-best. However, the loss will be
small if the agents are only mildly risk-averse, as the following example illustrates.
Example. Consider again our example for n = 2. Applying the results from Theorem 2,
it can be shown that e∗ = 2
α−1
β−α eFB and x∗ = 2
β−1
β−α tFB holds in any optimal contest. The
ratio of second-best to first-best profits of the principal is therefore
R =
2e∗ − x∗
2eFB − 2tFB =
2
β−1
β−α (eFB − tFB)
2(eFB − tFB) = 2
α−1
β−α .
This ratio is increasing in α, with R → 1 in the limit as α → 1, so second-best profits
approach first-best profits when the agents’ risk-aversion vanishes. 
The loss will also be small for any given risk-aversion if there are many agents, because
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the probability of not receiving any of the n − 1 identical prizes is 1/n in equilibrium
and vanishes as the number of agents grows. This has been observed before by Glazer
and Hassin (1988), and similar arguments can be found in Green and Stokey (1983) and
Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983). Here, these arguments imply that delegation comes with little
loss compared to an unconstrained mechanism design approach with monetary transfers if
risk-aversion is small or if the number of agents is large.
3.3 Unique Implementation
We say a contract Φ uniquely implements some pure-strategy effort profile e if it (i) im-
plements e and (ii) does not implement any other (possibly mixed) strategy profile σ 6= e.
The next theorem states that the second-best effort profile from Theorem 2 can be uniquely
implemented by an all-pay auction with a cap.
An all-pay auction is one of the canonical contest types (see Konrad, 2009, Ch. 2.1).
It is perfectly discriminating, in the sense that the agent with the highest effort wins the
highest prize with probability one, the agent with the second highest effort wins the second
prize, and so on. Ties are broken randomly. A cap is a maximum admissible effort level
(see Che and Gale, 1998). In our setting, a cap could be implemented in two different ways.
If efforts are not physically capped, the reviewer can still be instructed to not differentiate
effort levels at or above the cap, i.e., an agent who exerts effort exactly at the cap and
an agent who exerts effort above the cap are treated the same and have the same chance
of winning each of the prizes. A simpler implementation is to put an actual upper bound
on the effort that each agent can provide, e.g. by enforcing maximal work hours, limiting
the accumulation of overtime, or imposing page limits and deadlines on grant proposals.
See Gavious, Moldovanu, and Sela (2002) for many other examples of actual caps that are
imposed in different contests.
The following result shows that a cap at the optimal effort level e∗ generates a unique
equilibrium in the all-pay auction, which is in pure strategies.21
Theorem 3 The effort profile (e∗, ..., e∗) is uniquely implemented by an all-pay auction
with prize profile y = (x∗/(n− 1), ..., x∗/(n− 1), 0) and a cap at e∗.
To see why all agents exerting e∗ is an equilibrium, observe that upward deviations
are impossible (or ineffective) while downward deviations guarantee the zero prize. The
intuition for the result that no other pure-strategy equilibria exist is similar to that for
all-pay auctions without caps. For every effort profile e 6= (e∗, ..., e∗), either an upward
deviation discretely increases the probability of winning, or a downward deviation decreases
21Note that the all-pay auction without a cap does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. Therefore,
the max-min optimal ranking mechanism in Frankel (2014) would not be optimal in our setting with
endogenous efforts, because it is unable to implement the optimal effort profile.
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costs without changing the probability of winning. The last step in the proof is to show
that the cap destroys any potential mixed-strategy equilibrium.
An existing literature has investigated the effect of caps on equilibria and revenues in
all-pay auctions (see Che and Gale, 1998, for an early contribution and Olszewski and
Siegel, 2017, for a very general recent treatment). In particular, it is known that caps can
generate pure-strategy equilibria. In our setting, e∗ is the largest possible cap for which a
pure-strategy equilibrium still exists. This is intuitive. The principal wants to make the
contest as competitive as possible without destroying the pure-strategy equilibrium.
3.4 Implementation in Tullock Contests
The rent-seeking literature commonly studies contests that are imperfectly discriminating,
which means that higher effort translates smoothly into a higher winning probability (see
again Konrad, 2009). For the symmetric case with n agents but only one prize, such
contests are often characterized by a contest success function
pi(e) =
f(ei)∑
j∈I f(ej)
, (1)
which determines the probability that agent i wins the prize as a function of the effort
profile, where f is continuous, strictly increasing and satisfies f(0) = 0 (Skaperdas, 1996).
If all agents exert zero effort, each of them wins with equal probability. With more than
one prize, as in our optimal contests, the contest success function can be applied in a nested
fashion (see Clark and Riis, 1996): the first prize is allocated according to (1) among all n
agents, the second prize is allocated according to (1) restricted to those n− 1 agents who
have not received the first prize, and so on.
Tullock contests are a special case for f(ei) = eri , where r ≥ 0 is a parameter measuring
the randomness of the allocation rule. In particular, if r = 0 the winners are determined
randomly irrespective of the exerted efforts. On the other hand, as r → ∞ the contest
approaches the perfectly discriminating all-pay auction in which an agent exerting more
effort wins a higher prize for sure.
The contest theory literature has developed foundations for various functional forms
of the contest success function. For a comprehensive survey see Jia et al. (2013). Our
next result contributes to this literature by showing that a specific contest success function
arises as part of an optimally designed delegation mechanism.
18
Theorem 4 The effort profile (e∗, ..., e∗) is implemented by a nested contest with prize
profile y = (x∗/(n− 1), ..., x∗/(n− 1), 0) and the contest success function (1) for
f(ei) = c(ei)
r∗(n) with r∗(n) =
n− 1
Hn − 1 ,
where Hn =
∑n
k=1 1/k is the n-th harmonic number.
The optimal contest success function incorporates the agents’ cost function and thus
depends on the effort technology. It can be thought of as a generalization of the Tullock
contest success function to settings with non-linear cost. Furthermore, it always reduces
to the traditional Tullock shape f(ei) = eri when the cost function is c(ei) = γe
β
i , as in our
running example.
The optimal randomness parameter r∗(n) exhibits some noteworthy features. If there
are two agents and hence one prize, we obtain r∗(2) = 2. It is known that this is the
largest value of the parameter for which the contest still has a pure-strategy equilibrium
(see e.g. Ewerhart, 2017). Picking up our earlier discussion, the contest is therefore again
as competitive as possible without destroying the pure-strategy equilibrium. We conjecture
that a similar reasoning explains the value of r∗(n) for n > 2, but little is known about the
equilibrium structure of general nested Tullock contests. The parameter r∗(n) is strictly
increasing in the number of agents, which means that the optimal contest becomes more
discriminating as n grows. It holds that r∗(n) → ∞ in the limit as n → ∞, so that the
contest approaches the all-pay auction when the number of agents becomes large.
Theorem 4 shows that the optimum can be achieved by using an appropriately designed
imperfectly discriminating contest. This contest is strictly monotonic, in the sense that
higher effort always translates into strictly higher expected monetary payments.
4 Extensions
4.1 Imperfect Effort Observation
The assumption that the reviewer perfectly observes the individual effort of each agent
can be seen as a strong one. In this subsection, we investigate two different observational
constraints that may appear realistic. We will study a setting where only effort differences
between the agents but not the levels are observable, and one where only noisy signals of
the efforts are available. We restrict attention to the case of two agents throughout this
subsection.
We first assume that the reviewer does not observe the effort profile (e1, e2) but only
the difference ∆e = e1 − e2. We then define a contest with additive noise as a contest in
which the optimal prize x∗ is given to agent 1 if and only if ∆e+ ˜ ≥ 0, where ˜ is a random
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variable (see, for instance, Lazear and Rosen, 1981). Intuitively, agent 1 receives the prize
whenever the effort difference ∆e is larger than a randomly determined number. Such a
contest can be conducted if only ∆e is observable, but of course also if the entire profile e
can be observed. Our next result shows that a contest with additive noise implements the
optimum for an appropriate choice of the distribution of ˜.
Proposition 1 The effort profile (e∗, e∗) is implemented by a contest with additive noise
for ˜ ∼ U [−c(e∗)/c′(e∗), c(e∗)/c′(e∗)].
The randomness in the allocation rule ensures that unilateral deviations from (e∗, e∗) are
not profitable, because the winning probability adapts appropriately. The distribution can
neither be too noisy, which would create incentives to deviate to smaller effort levels, nor
to concentrated, which would create incentives to deviate to larger effort levels. Che and
Gale (2000) provide a general treatment of contests with additive uniform noise. They show
that these contests will often not have a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium. The uniform
distribution described in our Proposition 1 is chosen precisely to avoid this problem, i.e.,
to guarantee that the optimal pure-strategy effort profile is an equilibrium.
We next assume that the reviewer observes only noisy signals of the individual agents’
efforts. The usual interpretation is that agent i exerts effort ei but the final observable
output is a random variable e˜i that depends on ei. In fact, the principal may care about
output rather than effort, but since her payoffs are unaffected by noise with zero mean, here
we focus on randomness in the reviewer’s observation of efforts. Since effort is non-negative,
we assume that noise is multiplicative, such that
e˜i = eiη˜i
for a non-negative random variable η˜i. To ensure closed-form tractability, we assume that
the effort cost function is given by c(ei) = γeβi for some β > 1 and γ > 0. We furthermore
assume that the pair (η˜1, η˜2) follows a bivariate log-normal distribution,
(η˜1, η˜2) ∼ lnN
[(
ν1
ν2
)
,
(
σ21 σ12
σ12 σ
2
2
)]
.
It is possible – but not necessary for our analysis – to impose parameter constraints that
guarantee symmetry and/or that the expected value of e˜1 + e˜2 equals e1 + e2.
We now define a contest with multiplicative noise as a contest in which the optimal prize
x∗ is given to agent 1 if and only if η˜e˜1/e˜2 ≥ 1, where η˜ is a non-negative random variable
(see, for instance, Jia et al., 2013). Intuitively, agent 1 receives the prize whenever the
observed effort ratio e˜1/e˜2 is larger than a randomly determined number. As before, such
a contest could also be conducted if there is actually no noise in the observation. Our next
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result shows that a contest with multiplicative noise can indeed implement the optimum
when observation is not too noisy.
Proposition 2 If σ21 + σ22 − 2σ12 ≤ 2/(piβ2), then the effort profile (e∗, e∗) is implemented
by a contest with multiplicative noise for η˜ ∼ lnN [νη, σ2η] with
νη = ν2 − ν1 and σ2η =
2
piβ2
− (σ21 + σ22 − 2σ12).
As argued before, an appropriate level of randomness in the allocation guarantees
implementation of the optimum. Noisy observation of efforts already generates some
baseline randomness and can thus help to achieve the principal’s goal. The condition
σ21 +σ
2
2− 2σ12 ≤ 2/(piβ2) just requires that this noise is not too strong. For instance, if the
random variables η˜i are i.i.d., the condition simplifies to σ2i ≤ 1/(piβ2). Positive correlation
effectively reduces the observational noise and slackens it further. If it is satisfied, then
the randomness due to noisy effort observation can be raised to the appropriate level by
an additional random component in the contract. With η˜ as specified in the proposition,
the compound random variable (η˜2/η˜1)/η˜ follows a log-normal distribution with location
parameter ν = 0 and scale parameter σ2 = 2/(piβ2). As we show in the proof, (e∗, e∗) is an
equilibrium for the resulting stochastic allocation process.22
4.2 Non-Separability and Favoritism
The assumption that the agents have additively separable utility functions serves as a
natural starting point. It was used at several points in the analysis, but it matters mostly
for our characterization of the credibility constraint (IC-R). Here, separability implies that
the agents’ sunk efforts do not influence the reviewer’s preferences over the distribution of
the prizes. Without separability, different prize allocations may lead to different sums of
the agents’ utilities, which implies that the reviewer may no longer be indifferent between
all possible permutations.
In order to keep comparisons simple, we introduce non-separability directly into the
reviewer’s utility function, leaving the agents’ utility functions unchanged. For instance,
non-separability can be captured by modifying the reviewer’s payoff function to
piR(e, t, θ) = piP (e, t) + θ
n∑
i=1
h(pii(e, t)),
22The formulation of the proposition allows for σ2η = 0, by which we mean that η˜ is degenerate and
takes the value eνη with probability one. We are not aware of an explicit treatment of the multiplicative
log-normal noise model in the literature, but of course it can be transformed into a specific probit model
with additive normal noise (Dixit, 1987).
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for a strictly concave function h : R → R. Whenever θ > 0, which we will assume for the
following discussion, this transformation implies a concern for equality of the entire utilities
of the agents (“wide bracketing”), rather than just their utilities from monetary transfers
(“narrow bracketing”). In particular, the reviewer will prefer giving larger prizes to agents
who have exerted higher efforts.23
For a contest to remain credible, it now has to be perfectly discriminating. This rules
out contest success functions such as the Tullock form investigated in Section 3.4. However,
the all-pay auction discussed in Section 3.3 will continue to work.24
Favoritism of the reviewer is another potential problem. It can be captured by agent-
specific functions hi in the above expression. The reviewer will then prefer giving larger
prizes to agents he likes better, putting incentives at risk. To address this problem, a blind
reviewing process could make sure that the reviewer observes the chosen efforts but not the
identity of the agent who chose each effort. Blind reviews are indeed used for performance
evaluation (for example, see Goldin and Rouse, 2000). Garbling the reviewer’s information
in such a way comes at no loss with an optimal contest, but it helps to sustain credibility
despite possible asymmetries in how the reviewer wants to treat the agents.
These arguments show that contests are robust or can be made robust with respect
to non-separable preferences or favoritism. One may also ask if the principal can exploit
non-separable preferences or favoritism of the reviewer by writing a contract which is not
a contest. The answer to this question will depend on the exact nature of the principal’s
knowledge. With precise knowledge of preferences, it may indeed be the case that a stan-
dard contest is no longer optimal. We leave this extension to future research. However, it
is worth pointing out again that a robust contest will often achieve an outcome very close
to the first-best, leaving little additional gain from designing a more complex mechanism.
This is the case if the number of agents is sufficiently large (Glazer and Hassin, 1988; Green
and Stokey, 1983; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983) or if the agents’ risk-aversion is moderate.
We illustrate this in the following example.
Example. Consider our running example and fix β = 2 and γ = 1. Figure 1 depicts the
percentage of first-best payoffs that the principal can achieve with an optimal contest, as
a function of the risk-aversion parameter α and for several values of n. Two observations
23See Corchon and Dahm (2011) for a characterization of contest success functions which arise if a
contest organizer ex post allocates prizes to maximize some non-separable, non-expected utility function.
Similarly, Corchon and Dahm (2010) investigate contest success functions which arise when a contest
organizer of unknown type freely allocates prizes ex post.
24This argument rests on the interpretation of the cap as an actual bound on efforts. If efforts above e∗
are possible, a reviewer with non-separable utility may not want to follow the instruction to not differentiate
between effort levels at and above the cap. Even in that case, credibility of the contest can be restored using
tools from information design. The principal could structure the observation process such that deviations
above e∗ become unobservable to the reviewer (e.g. by forbidding the manager to call the workers on the
weekend) and conduct an otherwise standard all-pay auction. She could also try to add the right amount
of noise to make a perfectly discriminating contest optimal (see Proposition 2).
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are immediate. First, as α → 1 the share of the first-best payoffs that the principal can
capture converges to one. Second, for any given level of risk-aversion, the principal obtains
a larger share with a larger number of agents. The example also shows that, even for a
modest number of agents, the principal obtains a substantial share of the first-best payoffs
by running an optimal contest. For instance, already for n = 6 the principal captures more
than 90% of the first-best payoffs for any α ∈ (0, 1). 
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Figure 1: Share of first-best payoffs with an optimal contest.
4.3 Heterogeneous Abilities
We now consider a variation of the basic model in which the payoff of agent i is given by
pii(ei, ti) = u(ti)− ci(ei),
where the cost functions ci satisfy our previous assumptions but can be different across
agents. We first show that our main result is fully robust for the case of two agents.
Proposition 3 Suppose n = 2. For any profile of effort cost functions (c1, c2), the set of
optimal contracts contains a contest.
To understand the logic of the result, first note that our earlier Lemmas 1 to 4 continue
to hold under cost heterogeneity for any n. Hence it is still without loss of generality to
consider contracts that do not screen the reviewer’s type, implement a possibly asymmetric
pure-strategy effort profile, and distribute a fixed expected sum of transfers x. For any
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such contract, we then show that a contest with prize vector y = (x, 0) can implement
the same effort profile when there are two agents. In contrast to our previous results
for the symmetric case, the agents’ winning probabilities will typically not be identical in
equilibrium, because the agents may have to be compensated for different effort costs. The
following example illustrates this point more explicitly.
Example. Consider a variant of our running example with n = 2, α = 1, and hetero-
geneous effort costs ci(ei) = γieβi for γ1 < γ2. It can be shown that it is optimal for the
principal to implement the (first-best) effort levels
e∗1 =
(
1
βγ1
) 1
β−1
and e∗2 =
(
1
βγ2
) 1
β−1
.
This can be achieved by a contest with prize vector y = (x∗, 0) for x∗ = c1(e∗1) + c2(e∗2).
In equilibrium, agent i receives the prize x∗ with probability p∗i = ci(e∗i )/(c1(e∗1) + c2(e∗2)).
Hence the more efficient agent 1 is asked for higher equilibrium effort (e∗1 > e∗2). In this
example, the resulting difference in equilibrium efforts is so large that agent 1 bears a
higher total cost (c1(e∗1) > c2(e∗2)). To compensate this cost difference, the prize x∗ must
be allocated to agent 1 with a probability larger than 1/2. 
Generalizing the above argument to the case of n > 2 agents and a contest with n− 1
equal prizes faces the difficulty that some agents may have substantially higher effort costs
in equilibrium than others and cannot be compensated even if they win one of the identical
prizes for sure. Our next result rests on the insight that effort profiles for which the agents’
costs are so strongly heterogeneous cannot be optimal if the agents’ cost functions are not
strongly heterogeneous. In that case, a contest with n − 1 equal prizes and one prize of
zero is still optimal. To formalize this idea, we fix any sequence of cost function profiles
(cm1 , . . . , c
m
n )m∈N such that, for each i ∈ I, the sequence (cmi )m∈N converges uniformly to
some common cost function c as m→∞.
Proposition 4 Suppose (cm1 , . . . , cmn ) → (c, . . . , c) uniformly. Then there exists m ∈ N
such that for all m ≥ m the set of optimal contracts contains a contest.
A “loser-gets-nothing” contest thus remains optimal whenever the differences in abilities
are not too large. Again, the optimal contest will typically ask for different effort levels
from different agents, and it allocates the zero prize with non-identical probabilities across
the agents in equilibrium. For example, suppose that the cost heterogeneity is small enough
for Proposition 4 to apply. Denote by (e∗1, ..., e∗n) the optimal effort profile and let e∗ =
mini∈I e∗i . This optimum can be implemented by a modified all-pay auction with a cap.
For any real effort profile e = (e1, . . . , en), we first compute a “virtual effort profile” eˆ =
(eˆ1, . . . , eˆn) by eˆi = (e∗/e∗i )ei for every agent. Then the prizes are allocated as in an all-pay
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auction with cap e∗ in which eˆ = (eˆ1, . . . , eˆn) is taken as the actual efforts exerted by the
agents. In equilibrium, when e = (e∗1, . . . , e∗n) and thus eˆ = (e∗, . . . , e∗), ties are broken such
that agent i receives one of the positive prizes with probability p∗i = ci(e∗i )/u(x∗/(n− 1)),
which is exactly enough to compensate for his effort cost. Thus the auction (i) handicaps
agents who have to provide higher efforts by reducing their performance to lower virtual
efforts, and (ii) compensates those agents who experience higher equilibrium effort costs
by breaking ties with higher probability in their favor.
One may conjecture that a contract with more than two prize levels becomes optimal
when the agents are very different from each other. This turns out to be true. Our next
result shows that, for arbitrary heterogeneity in the agents’ effort costs, a generalized contest
is always optimal. Such a contest is described by two prize profiles y and yd, where the
prizes y are allocated in equilibrium and the prizes yd are allocated after deviations. In
essence, the reviewer gets to choose between two different contests and finds it optimal to
select one of them in equilibrium, while the other one remains an unused (but credible)
off-equilibrium threat. The special case of a standard contest arises when y = yd.
Proposition 5 For any profile of effort cost functions (c1, . . . , cn), the set of optimal con-
tracts contains a generalized contest.
As the proof of Proposition 5 reveals, the optimal equilibrium prize profile y no longer
features n − 1 equal prizes when costs are sufficiently heterogeneous. Instead, there are
multiple different prize levels which reflect the heterogeneity in equilibrium effort costs.
While real-world contests often feature only two prize levels (for instance, the size
of research grants is often fixed, students sometimes receive only pass-fail grades, tenure
is either granted or declined, and workers are promoted or not), there are also contests
with multiple prize levels. GE under Jack Welch separated their employees into three
performance levels,25 and grades are often given on a scale from A to D. According to
our theory, multiple prize levels are offered as a response to heterogeneity in the agents’
abilities. The prediction of our model is that multiple prize levels will be more likely in
contests which are held among a population of agents where heterogeneity is high (for
example, students in a public school), and that two prize levels will be more likely if the
population of agents is more homogeneous (for example, junior analysts in a consulting
firm).26
25See “’Rank and Yank’ Retains Vocal Fans” (L. Kwoh, The Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2012).
26There are other reasons for using multiple prize levels. Moldovanu and Sela (2001) find, in a model with
incomplete information and risk-neutral agents, that multiple prizes can be optimal for effort maximization
when cost functions are convex. Olszewski and Siegel (2017b) develop a novel approach to contest design,
which can be used for very general classes of large contests with many agents. They characterize the
distribution of prizes which maximizes the aggregate effort exerted by the agents. Among other results,
they find that multiple prizes of different levels are optimal when agents have convex costs or are risk-averse.
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4.4 Cheap Talk
In the main model, we assumed that the principal delegates to the reviewer the decision
on how to reward the agents. In this section, we consider a cheap talk model where the
reviewer only reports the observed efforts to the principal, who then decides how to reward
the agents. Similar to Kolotilin et al. (2013), we allow the principal to ex ante limit the
set from which she can take her action ex post.
The timing is as follows. First, the principal commits to a set D ⊆ ∆T of possible
actions. Next, the agents choose their efforts simultaneously. The reviewer then observes
the efforts (and his type) and reports back to the principal. After receiving the report, the
principal chooses an action from D to reward or punish the agents.
Our previous analysis can be modified to capture this cheap talk setting. Given a
credible contract as defined before, we reinterpret µe,θ as the report of a type-θ reviewer who
has observed e, rather than as the action that the reviewer can take himself. This report can
be interchangeably interpreted as a direct communication of (e, θ) or as a recommendation
to pay the agents according to µe,θ. The following additional constraint then ensures that
the principal always has an incentive to follow the reviewer’s recommendation:
piP (e, µ
e,θ) ≥ piP (e, µe′,θ′) ∀(e, θ), (e′, θ′) ∈ E ×Θ, (IC-P)
where piP (e, µe
′,θ′) = Eµe′,θ′ [piP (e, t)]. We are interested in problem (P) with the additional
cheap talk constraint (IC-P). The solution to this problem describes the optimum that the
principal can achieve in the cheap talk setting.27
Given this formulation of the problem, it is obvious that the cheap talk setting is weakly
less permissive than the delegation setting. In the presence of a commitment problem,
keeping the authority to make decisions may harm the principal. The following example
illustrates possible consequences of the additional constraint (IC-P).
Example. Reconsider the first-best contract ΦFB for n = 2 and a reviewer of known
type θ = 3 derived for our parametric example in Section 3. This contract rewards the
first-best efforts by the transfer profile (tFB, tFB) and punishes unilateral deviations by one
of the profiles (tnd, 0) or (0, tnd). Since 2tFB ≈ 0.32 < tnd ≈ 1.15, the sum of transfers is
not constant across these profiles. Hence the contract violates (IC-P). With this contract,
the principal would exhibit a leniency bias. To induce the altruistic reviewer to report
27The constraints (IC-R), (IC-A) and (IC-P) again characterize the Perfect Bayesian equilibria of an
extensive form game. Consider the game described in footnote 16 and reinterpret the reviewer’s choice
from D as a recommendation to the principal. Then add a stage where the principal, after observing
the recommendation but not the true state (e, θ), makes the choice from D. Despite the complexity of
the principal’s information sets, many of which are off the equilibrium path, constraint (IC-P) prescribes
sequential rationality (given any weakly consistent beliefs) for all these information sets. The reason is
that the principal’s best responses in these information sets are independent of her beliefs about (e, θ).
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a deviator truthfully, the punishment has to be combined with a very large payment tnd
to the non-deviating agent. Ex post, the principal would not be willing to carry out this
costly punishment. 
The next result shows that, with uncertainty about θ, the principal does not lose by
keeping the authority to allocate rewards to the agents.
Proposition 6 Any credible contract which does not screen reviewer types satisfies (IC-P).
The result follows from the observation that, by Lemma 2, for each credible contract
that does not screen the reviewer’s type, there exists a value x such that Eµe,θ [
∑n
i=1 ti] = x
for all (e, θ) ∈ E ×Θ. But then
piP (e, µ
e′,θ′) =
n∑
i=1
ei − Eµe′,θ′
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
=
n∑
i=1
ei − x
is independent of (e′, θ′), so the principal always has an incentive to follow the reviewer’s
recommendation. An immediate corollary of this result is that any contest, and moreover
any generalized contest, satisfies the additional constraint (IC-P). Thus, all optimal contests
derived for the delegation setting remain optimal in the cheap talk setting.
5 Related Literature
Our contribution is related to three distinct groups of papers. First, the optimal delegation
mechanism in our paper is a contest, so we contribute to the literature examining conditions
under which contests are optimal incentive mechanisms. Second, we work with a three-
tiered hierarchical structure with a lenient reviewer. There are several papers featuring
a similar structure. Third, the principal in our model delegates the decision on how to
reward the agents to the reviewer. Our paper is therefore related to the literature on
optimal delegation. We will discuss the connections and differences of our paper to each of
these strands of literature in turn.
Optimality of contests. In their seminal paper, Lazear and Rosen (1981) show
that contests can implement the socially optimal effort levels when agents are risk-neutral.
They assume perfectly competitive labor markets in which the agents obtain all the surplus.
Contests are then among the optimal mechanisms because they can induce first-best effort.
At the same time, the set of optimal mechanisms also contains a piece-rate contract, among
others. For the case of risk-averse agents, Lazear and Rosen (1981) compare the two specific
mechanisms of piece-rate contracts and contests. They show that either of them sometimes
dominates the other, but they do not establish results on global optimality.
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A defining feature of contests is that the payoff of the agents depends on how well they
perform relative to each other. This feature can make contests optimal in the presence
of common uncertainty (see Holmstrom, 1982, and Mookherjee, 1984, for a general suffi-
cient statistics approach to relative performance pay). Both Green and Stokey (1983) and
Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) show that contests can do better than individual contracts
when agents are risk-averse and there is a random common shock to their outputs. If the
relationship between effort and output is ambiguous and the agents are ambiguity-averse,
Kellner (2015) shows that contests can be optimal because they filter out the common
ambiguity.
In our paper, contests provide a commitment for lenient reviewers to punish shirking
agents. Contests are optimal because they incentivize the agents at least as efficiently as
any other contract that can provide such a commitment.
Lenient reviewer. Several papers have looked at a three-tiered hierarchy with a
lenient reviewer. Prendergast and Topel (1996) and Giebe and Gürtler (2012) consider a
situation where the reviewer is facing a single agent and the principal can write contracts
where the reviewer’s pay is contingent on his behavior. In Prendergast and Topel (1996),
both the reviewer and the principal receive a signal about the worker’s effort. Their main
result is that leniency need not be costly for the firm, because it can charge the reviewer for
exercising leniency. In Giebe and Gürtler (2012), the principal offers a menu of contracts
to screen lenient and non-lenient reviewers. They show that if the non-lenient type is
common enough, the optimal solution can be to pay a flat wage to the reviewer, and rely
on the non-lenient type for punishment of agents who shirk. The main difference between
these papers and ours is that we consider multiple agents and do not allow contracts which
condition payment to the reviewer on the reported evaluation.
Svensson (2003) applies a model with a lenient reviewer to the design of allocation
mechanisms for foreign aid. The principal wants to use aid to incentivize countries to
implement reforms. In his model, the principal determines the allocation mechanism, but
the aid is then distributed by a country manager whose utility takes into account the
well-being of the target countries. Svensson (2003) proposes a mechanism where each
country manager is given a budget for several similar countries but has discretion in how
to allocate the aid across countries. He shows that under certain conditions this mechanism
can incentivize countries to reform. Like in our paper, Svensson (2003) considers multiple
agents and does not allow for conditional monetary payments to the reviewer. The main
difference is that we solve for the optimal delegation mechanism while Svensson (2003)
compares two specific mechanisms.
Optimal delegation. In the usual delegation problem, the agent (the reviewer in our
setting) is better informed about some exogenous state of the world. The principal delegates
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a unidimensional decision to the agent, but restricts the set of actions that the agent can
choose. The question is how this set should be designed if the preferences of the principal
and the agent are misaligned. The first to formulate the problem and show the existence of
a solution was Holmström (1977, 1984), who focussed on interval delegation sets. Melumad
and Shibano (1991) show that the optimal delegation set does not necessarily take the form
of an interval. Alonso and Matouschek (2008) and Amador and Bagwell (2013) characterize
the optimal delegation sets in progressively more general environments and find conditions
under which the optimal delegation set is indeed an interval.
The canonical delegation model has been applied and extended in a number of ways.28
In the multidimensional delegation model by Frankel (2014), which we have already dis-
cussed in the Introduction, optimal mechanisms exhibit what he calls the “aligned delega-
tion” property, which means that all agents behave in the same way as the principal would
behave. Our optimal mechanisms also satisfy the aligned delegation property, i.e., the
equilibrium behavior of reviewers is independent of their type. Krähmer and Kováč (2016)
assume that the agent has a privately known type which encodes his ability to interpret the
private information he receives later on. They also find that screening is not beneficial in a
large range of cases. Tanner (2014) obtains a no-screening result in a standard delegation
model with uncertain bias of the agent.
Most papers cited above focus on deterministic delegation mechanisms. Kováč and
Mylovanov (2009) and Goltsman, Hörner, Pavlov, and Squintani (2009) allow for stochas-
tic delegation mechanisms and derive conditions under which the optimal mechanism is
deterministic. We allow for stochastic mechanisms, and our optimal mechanism is indeed
non-deterministic, but in a special sense – the contest prizes are allocated according to a
probabilistic contest success function of the agents’ efforts.
Finally, instead of delegating the decision to the agent, the principal could ask the agent
to report the state of the world and take the action herself. This is the question addressed
in the cheap talk literature in the tradition of Crawford and Sobel (1982). Several papers
ask if the principal is better off delegating the decision or just asking for advice. Bester
and Krähmer (2008) find that, if the agent needs to exert effort after selecting a project,
delegation of the project selection is less likely to be optimal. Kolotilin et al. (2013) consider
a model of cheap talk where the principal can ex ante commit not to take a certain action
ex post. Again, they show that cheap talk with commitment can outperform delegation.
On the other hand, Dessein (2002), Krishna and Morgan (2008), and Ivanov (2010) find
that, in general, delegation is better than cheap talk. However, Fehr, Herz, and Wilkening
(2013) and Bartling, Fehr, and Herz (2014) provide experimental evidence showing that
28See Armstrong and Vickers (2010) for an application to merger policy, Pei (2015a) for a model where
delegation is used to conceal the principal’s private type, Guo (2016) for a model of delegation of experi-
mentation, and Frankel (2017) for a model of delegated hiring decisions.
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individuals value decision rights intrinsically, which implies that delegation may not take
place even when it is beneficial. These issues do not arise in our model. We can implement
in a cheap talk setting exactly the same outcome as with the optimal delegation mechanism,
provided the principal can commit to constraining her own actions in the same way as she
can constrain the actions of the reviewer.
The main difference between our paper and the above discussed delegation literature is
that the state of the world, on which the expert has private information, is exogenous in
the delegation literature, while it is endogenous in our paper. In our model, the reviewer
observes the efforts exerted by the agents. Since the incentives of the agents depend on
the behavior of the reviewer, which in turn depends on the given delegation set, the state
of the world is affected by the principal’s choice of the delegation set.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed a three-tiered structure consisting of a principal, a reviewer,
and n agents. The principal designs a reward scheme in order to induce the agents to exert
effort. However, the principal does not observe the efforts, so she delegates the allocation
of rewards to the reviewer. The reviewer has private information about the utility weights
he puts on the payoffs of the principal and of the agents.
Our main result is that a very simple mechanism, a contest, is optimal. By providing a
commitment for the reviewer to punish shirking agents, a contest efficiently incentivizes the
agents to exert costly effort. We also characterize the set of all optimal contests and show
that they have a flat reward structure with n− 1 equal positive prizes and one zero prize.
Finally, we show that the optimum can be achieved with several common contest success
functions, including all-pay auctions with caps, nested Tullock contests, and contests with
additive or multiplicative noise. Our results are robust in a range of extensions, including
imperfect observation of efforts and asymmetric abilities of the agents.
Other interesting questions could be asked in the framework of delegated performance
evaluation. Here we will mention three immediate ones. First, the framework developed
here can be used to study other forms of reviewer bias. A particularly important bias that
could be examined is the gender bias (Goldin and Rouse, 2000). Moreover, it would be
possible to examine how different biases like leniency and gender bias interact in shaping
an optimal contract. Second, in addition to incentivizing agents, principals will often be
interested in screening the abilities of heterogeneous agents in order to be able to assign
more responsibilities to more capable agents. The purpose of a tenure or promotion contest
is obviously not only to induce hard work, but also to select the right agents for a more
advanced position. A question that could be asked in this framework is how screening and
provision of incentives interact when both are delegated to potentially biased reviewers.
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Finally, the principal also hires the reviewer. At first blush, our results might seem to
suggest that the principal would be better off by trying to recruit a selfish reviewer who
will not take the well-being of the agents into account. However, that would be the case
only if the principal was able to determine the reviewer’s type with absolute certainty.
If there is a small remaining uncertainty, our results hold and assert that the principal’s
maximal payoff in an optimal contest does not depend on the reviewer’s type. This implies
that the principal is free to select the reviewer based on other criteria. For instance, an
altruistic mid-level manager may outperform a selfish one in uniting his team to face a
common challenge.
Of course, using a contest can also have drawbacks in some circumstances, for instance
when the agents can easily sabotage each other’s efforts. However, contests are widely used
in reality, and our results offer a novel explanation for their optimality. We also point to
new applications where contest-like mechanisms could be profitably implemented. Settings
where an intermediary allocates monetary rewards are widespread in the economy, and, as
the example of foreign aid illustrates, they can be found in unexpected places.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
A.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1
If-statement. We first show that (IC-R) is implied by (i) - (iii). Note that (IC-R) can be
rewritten as
S(e, θ)− S(e′, θ′) ≥ (θ − θ′)Su(e′, θ′) ∀(e, θ), (e′, θ′) ∈ E ×Θ.
Using (i) and (iii), this is equivalent to the requirement that, ∀e′ ∈ E and ∀θ, θ′ ∈ Θ,∫ θ
θ′
(Su(e
′, s)− Su(e′, θ′)) ds ≥ 0,
and this inequality indeed holds since Su(e′, θ) is non-decreasing in θ by (ii).
Only-if-statement. We now proceed to prove that (IC-R) implies (i) - (iii). Note that
for the special case θ′ = θ, (IC-R) is reduced to the requirement that S(e, θ) ≥ S(e′, θ)
∀e, e′ ∈ E. Interchanging e and e′, we immediately obtain (i). Next, consider the special
case where e′ = e. For this case, (IC-R) requires that, ∀θ, θ′ ∈ Θ,
S(e, θ) ≥ −St(e, θ′) + θSu(e, θ′) (ICθ,θ′)
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and
S(e, θ′) ≥ −St(e, θ) + θ′Su(e, θ). (ICθ′,θ)
Summing up (ICθ,θ′) and (ICθ′,θ) we obtain
(θ − θ′) (Su(e, θ)− Su(e, θ′)) ≥ 0 ∀θ, θ′ ∈ Θ.
Thus, Su(e, θ) must be non-decreasing in θ, which is condition (ii). The envelope formula
in (iii) follows directly from Theorem 2 of Milgrom and Segal (2002), where absolute
continuity of S(e, θ) holds because the set of transfer profiles is bounded. 
A.1.2 Proof of Lemma 2
By Lemma 1, credibility implies that, ∀e, e′ ∈ E and ∀θ ∈ Θ,
δ(e, e′, θ) = S(e, θ)− S(e′, θ) =
∫ θ
θ
(Su(e, s)− Su(e′, s)) ds = 0.
This implies that, for any fixed e, e′ ∈ E, Su(e, θ) = Su(e′, θ) for almost every θ ∈ Θ. It
then also immediately follows that St(e, θ) = St(e′, θ) for almost every θ ∈ Θ. Now choose
an arbitrary e′ ∈ E and define the functions x and xˆ by
x(θ) = St(e
′, θ), xˆ(θ) = Su(e′, θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ.
It follows that, for any e ∈ E, St(e, θ) = x(θ) and Su(e, θ) = xˆ(θ) for almost all θ ∈ Θ. 
A.1.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Suppose Φ = (µe,θ)(e,θ)∈E×Θ implements σ. In particular, Φ is credible, so by Lemma 2
there exists a pair of function x and xˆ such that, ∀e ∈ E,
Eµe,θ
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
= x(θ), Eµe,θ
[
n∑
i=1
u(ti)
]
= xˆ(θ),
for almost every θ ∈ Θ. Since Φ implements σ, we also have ∀i ∈ I and ∀σ′i ∈ ∆R+,
Eσ
[
Eτ
[
Eµe,θ [u(ti)]
]− c(ei)] ≥ E(σ′i,σ−i) [Eτ [Eµe,θ [u(ti)]]− c(ei)] .
The expected payoff of the principal with (σ,Φ) is given by
ΠP (σ,Φ) = Eσ
[
n∑
i=1
ei − Eτ
[
Eµe,θ
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]]]
= Eσ
[
n∑
i=1
ei
]
− Eτ [x(θ)] .
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For every e ∈ E, define a probability measure µe ∈ ∆T such that
µe(A) = Eτ
[
µe,θ(A)
]
for all measurable subsets A ⊆ T .29 Now construct an alternative contract Φˆ by setting
µˆe,θ = µe for all (e, θ) ∈ E × Θ. This contract satisfies the property of θ-independence
stated in the lemma. Since, ∀(e, θ) ∈ E ×Θ,
Sˆt(e, θ) = Eµˆe,θ
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
= Eµe
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
= Eτ
[
Eµe,θ
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]]
= Eτ [x(θ)] ,
Sˆu(e, θ) = Eµˆe,θ
[
n∑
i=1
u(ti)
]
= Eµe
[
n∑
i=1
u(ti)
]
= Eτ
[
Eµe,θ
[
n∑
i=1
u(ti)
]]
= Eτ [xˆ(θ)] ,
by Lemma 1 it is straightforward to check that Φˆ is credible. Furthermore, note that
Πi(σ
′, Φˆ) = Eσ′
[
Eτ
[
Eµˆe,θ [u(ti)]
]− c(ei)]
= Eσ′ [Eτ [Eµe [u(ti)]]− c(ei)]
= Eσ′
[
Eτ
[
Eµe,θ [u(ti)]
]− c(ei)]
= Πi(σ
′,Φ)
for all σ′ and i ∈ I, which implies that Φˆ implements σ because Φ implements σ.
Finally, from the above arguments we also obtain that the principal’s expected payoff
is Eσ [
∑n
i=1 ei]− Eτ [x(θ)] with both (σ,Φ) and (σ, Φˆ). 
A.1.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Suppose Φ = (µe)e∈E implements σ. We first construct a probability measure η ∈ ∆T by
η(A) = Eσ [µe(A)]
for all measurable subsets A ⊆ T . Furthermore, for each i ∈ I we construct a probability
measure η(i) ∈ ∆T by setting
η(i)(A) = Eσ
[
µ(0,e−i)(A)
]
for all measurable subsets A ⊆ T . We now construct an alternative contract Φˆ = (µˆe)e∈E
as follows. For e = e¯, we let µˆe = η. For any e = (ei, e¯−i) with ei 6= e¯i, we let µˆe = η(i).
For all remaining e, we let µˆe = µe.
29The assumption discussed in footnote 15 ensures that the expectation (as well as the ones in the proof
of the next lemma) is well-defined. It is also easy to show that µe is indeed a probability measure.
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We first show that Φˆ is credible. Since Φ is credible and its transfers are independent of
θ, by Lemma 2 there exist x, xˆ ∈ R+ such that Eµe [
∑n
i=1 ti] = x and Eµe [
∑n
i=1 u(ti)] = xˆ
for all e ∈ E. First consider µˆe for e = e¯. We obtain
Eµˆe¯
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
= Eη
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
= Eσ
[
Eµe
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]]
= Eσ[x] = x
and, by the analogous argument, Eµˆe¯ [
∑n
i=1 u(ti)] = xˆ. Now consider µˆ
e for e = (ei, e¯−i)
with ei 6= e¯i. We obtain
Eµˆ(ei,e¯−i)
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
= Eη(i)
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
= Eσ
[
Eµ(0,e−i)
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]]
= Eσ[x] = x
and, by the analogous argument, Eµˆ(ei,e¯−i) [
∑n
i=1 u(ti)] = xˆ. Since Φˆ and Φ are identical for
all other e, we can conclude that Eµˆe [
∑n
i=1 ti] = x and Eµˆe [
∑n
i=1 u(ti)] = xˆ for all e ∈ E.
It is then straightforward to check that Φˆ is credible by using Lemma 1.
We next show that, in Φˆ, for each agent i ∈ I it is a best response to play e¯i when
the remaining agents are playing e¯−i, which implies that Φˆ implements e¯. This claim holds
because, ∀i ∈ I and ∀e′i 6= e¯i,
Πi(e¯, Φˆ) = Eη[u(ti)]− c(e¯i)
= Eσ[Eµe [u(ti)]]− c (Eσ[ei])
≥ Eσ[Eµe [u(ti)]]− Eσ[c(ei)] (2)
≥ Eσ
[
Eµ(0,e−i) [u(ti)]
]
≥ Eσ
[
Eµ(0,e−i) [u(ti)]
]
− c(e′i)
= Eη(i) [u(ti)]− c(e′i) = Πi((e′i, e¯−i), Φˆ),
where the first inequality follows the convexity of c and the second inequality follows from
the fact that Φ implements σ.
Finally, from the above arguments we also obtain that the principal’s expected payoff
is
∑n
i=1 e¯i − x with both (σ,Φ) and (e¯, Φˆ). 
A.1.5 Proof of Lemma 5
Suppose Φ = (µe)e∈E implements e¯. We now construct an alternative contract Φˆ = (µˆe)e∈E
as follows. For e = eˆ, we define µˆe by generating a profile of prizes t = (t1, ..., tn) according
to µe¯ and then allocating these prizes randomly and uniformly among the agents. For any
e = (ei, eˆ−i) with ei 6= eˆi, we let µˆe by given as follows. A number j is drawn uniformly
from I and then a profile of prizes t = (t1, ..., tn) is generated according to µ(0,e¯−j). The
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deviating agent i gets the prize tj and the remaining n−1 prizes are allocated randomly and
uniformly among the non-deviating agents. Note that, by construction, this punishment
rule for unilateral deviations does not depend on the identity of the agent being punished.
For all remaining e, we let µˆe = µe.
We first show that Φˆ is credible. By Lemma 2, credibility and θ-independence of Φ
imply that there exists x, xˆ ∈ R+ such that Eµe [
∑n
i=1 ti] = x and Eµe [
∑n
i=1 u(ti)] = xˆ for
all e ∈ E. Now first consider µˆe for e = eˆ. We obtain
Eµˆeˆ
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
= Eµe¯
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
= x,
Eµˆeˆ
[
n∑
i=1
u(ti)
]
= Eµe¯
[
n∑
i=1
u(ti)
]
= xˆ.
Now consider µˆe for any e = (ei, eˆ−i) with ei 6= eˆi. We obtain
Eµˆ(ei,eˆ−i)
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
=
n∑
j=1
1
n
E
µ(0,e¯−j)
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
=
1
n
n∑
j=1
x = x,
Eµˆ(ei,eˆ−i)
[
n∑
i=1
u(ti)
]
=
n∑
j=1
1
n
E
µ(0,e¯−j)
[
n∑
i=1
u(ti)
]
=
1
n
n∑
j=1
xˆ = xˆ.
Since Φˆ and Φ are identical for all other e, we can conclude that Eµˆe [
∑n
i=1 ti] = x and
Eµˆe [
∑n
i=1 u(ti)] = xˆ for all e ∈ E. It is then straightforward to check that Φˆ is credible by
using Lemma 1.
We next show that, in Φˆ, for each agent i ∈ I it is a best response to play eˆi when the
remaining agents are playing eˆ−i, which implies that Φˆ implements eˆ. To prove this claim,
note that
Eµe¯ [u(ti)]− c(e¯i) ≥ Eµ(0,e¯−i) [u(ti)]
holds for all i ∈ I because Φ implements e¯. Summing over all i ∈ I and dividing by n
yields
Eµe¯
[
1
n
n∑
k=1
u(tk)
]
− 1
n
n∑
k=1
c(e¯k) ≥ 1
n
n∑
k=1
E
µ(0,e¯−k) [u(tk)] .
We now obtain, ∀i ∈ I and ∀ei 6= eˆi,
Πi(eˆ, Φˆ) = Eµˆeˆ [u(ti)]− c (eˆi)
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= Eµe¯
[
1
n
n∑
k=1
u(tk)
]
− c(eˆi)
≥ Eµe¯
[
1
n
n∑
k=1
u(tk)
]
− 1
n
n∑
k=1
c(e¯k)
≥ 1
n
n∑
k=1
E
µ(0,e¯−k) [u(tk)]− c(ei)
= Eµˆ(ei,eˆ−i) [u(ti)]− c(ei) = Πi((ei, eˆ−i), Φˆ),
where the first inequality follows from convexity of c. Hence the claim follows.
Finally, from the above arguments we also obtain that the principal’s expected payoff
is
∑n
i=1 e¯i − x with both (e¯,Φ) and (eˆ, Φˆ). 
A.1.6 Proof of Lemma 6
Suppose Φ = (µe)e∈E implements the symmetric profile eˆ. From the proof of Lemma 5
we know that it is without loss of generality to assume that Φ has the following form. If
e = eˆ, a profile of prizes t = (t1, ..., tn) is generated according to some probability measure
pi and these prizes are randomly and uniformly allocated to the agents. If e = (ei, eˆ−i) with
ei 6= eˆi for some i ∈ I, a profile of prizes td = (td1, ..., tdn) is generated according to some
(i-independent) probability measure ρ and agent i gets tdn, while the remaining n−1 prizes
are randomly and uniformly allocated among the other agents. For all other effort profiles
e, the transfer rule can be chosen as for eˆ. Thus, we have
Eµeˆ [u(ti)] = Epi
[
1
n
n∑
k=1
u(tk)
]
, Eµ(ei,eˆ−i) [u(ti)] = Eρ[u(t
d
n)].
Furthermore, by Lemma 2, credibility and θ-independence of Φ imply that there exist
x, xˆ ∈ R+ such that Eµe [
∑n
i=1 ti] = x and Eµe [
∑n
i=1 u(ti)] = xˆ for all e ∈ E.
Now construct a contest Cy with prize profile y as follows. Define td as the certainty
equivalent of a deviating agent’s random transfers in contract Φ, i.e., u(td) = Eρ[u(tdn)].
Note that td ≤ Eρ[tdn] by concavity of u. Then define the prize profile
y =
(
x− td
n− 1 , . . . ,
x− td
n− 1 , t
d
)
.
The allocation rule of Cy is as follows. If e = eˆ, the prizes are randomly and uniformly
allocated among all agents. If e = (ei, eˆ−i) with ei 6= eˆi for some i ∈ I, the deviating agent
i obtains td and all other agents obtain (x− td)/(n− 1). For all other effort profiles e, the
prizes are again randomly and uniformly allocated among all agents.
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Since Cy is a contest, it is credible. Furthermore, ∀i ∈ I and ∀ei 6= eˆi,
Πi(eˆ, Cy) =
(
n− 1
n
)
u
(
x− td
n− 1
)
+
1
n
u(td)− c(eˆi)
≥
(
n− 1
n
)
u
(
Eρ[
∑n
k=1 t
d
k)]− Eρ[tdn)]
n− 1
)
+
1
n
Eρ[u(tdn)]− c(eˆi)
=
(
n− 1
n
)
u
(
Eρ
[
n−1∑
k=1
1
n− 1t
d
k
])
+
1
n
Eρ[u(tdn)]− c(eˆi)
≥
(
n− 1
n
)
Eρ
[
u
(
n−1∑
k=1
1
n− 1t
d
k
)]
+
1
n
Eρ[u(tdn)]− c(eˆi)
≥
(
n− 1
n
)
Eρ
[
n−1∑
k=1
1
n− 1u
(
tdk
)]
+
1
n
Eρ[u(tdn)]− c(eˆi)
= Eρ
[
1
n
n−1∑
k=1
u
(
tdk
)]
+ Eρ
[
1
n
u
(
tdn
)]− c(eˆi)
= Eρ
[
1
n
n∑
k=1
u
(
tdk
)]− c(eˆi)
= Epi
[
1
n
n∑
k=1
u(tk)
]
− c(eˆi)
≥ Eρ
[
u(tdn)
]− c(ei)
= u(td)− c(ei) = Πi((ei, eˆ−i), Cy),
where the first inequality follows from td ≤ Eρ[tdn], the second and third inequalities follow
from concavity of u, and the last inequality follows from the fact that Φ implements eˆ. We
can thus conclude that Cy also implements eˆ.
Finally, from the above arguments we also obtain that the principal’s expected payoff
is
∑n
i=1 eˆi − x with both (eˆ,Φ) and (eˆ, Cy). 
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Only-if-statement. Suppose (σ∗, C∗y ) solves (P). We first claim that σ∗ must be a pure-
strategy effort profile. By contradiction, suppose there exists j ∈ I such that σ∗j is not a
Dirac measure. We can now proceed exactly as in the proof of Lemma 4 to construct a
contract Φˆ (in fact, a contest) that implements a pure-strategy profile e¯. The only difference
to the proof of Lemma 4 is that we let e¯j = Eσ∗j [ej] +  for some  > 0 (but still e¯i = Eσ∗i [ei]
for all i 6= j). Credibility of Φˆ and the fact that e¯i is a best response to e¯−i for all i 6= j
follow exactly as in the proof of Lemma 4. Since c is strictly convex and σ∗j is not a Dirac
measure, the first inequality in (2) is strict for j when  = 0. It then follows that e¯j is a
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best response to e¯−j for sufficiently small  > 0. Since the principal’s payoff with (e¯, Φˆ) is
increased by , (σ∗, C∗y ) cannot have been a solution to (P).
Now suppose (e¯, C∗y ) solves (P), where e¯ may still be asymmetric. Denote x =
∑n
k=1 yk.
We next show that whenever yn > 0, there exists another contest Cy˜ with
∑n
k=1 y˜k = x
that implements an effort profile e˜ with
∑n
i=1 e˜i >
∑n
i=1 e¯i, and hence (e¯, C
∗
y ) cannot have
been a solution to (P). Denote by pki (e) the probability that agent i receives prize yk in C∗y
when the effort profile is e. Note that
Πi(e¯, C
∗
y ) =
n∑
k=1
pki (e¯)u(yk)− c(e¯i) ≥
n∑
k=1
pki (0, e¯−i)u(yk) ≥ u(yn),
because C∗y implements e¯. Now consider an agent j ∈ I for which pnj (e¯) < 1. Construct
a contest Cy˜ with a profile of prizes y˜ given by y˜1 = y1 + δ, y˜n = yn − δ, and y˜k = yk for
all k 6= 1, n, where δ ∈ (0, yn]. Note that
∑n
k=1 y˜k = x. Let effort profile e˜ be such that
e˜j = e¯j +  and e˜i = e¯i for all i 6= j, where  > 0. Note that
∑n
i=1 e˜i >
∑n
i=1 e¯i. The rule of
contest Cy˜ is the following. If the effort profile is e˜, then the prizes y˜ are allocated such that
each agent i receives prize y˜k with probability p˜ki (e˜) = pki (e¯). If some agent i unilaterally
deviates from e˜, then agent i receives the prize y˜n, while the prizes y˜1, . . . , y˜n−1 are allocated
randomly and uniformly among the remaining agents. Otherwise, the allocation of prizes
can be chosen arbitrarily. For sufficiently small  > 0 we then have, ∀i ∈ I and ∀ei ∈ R+,
Πi(e˜, Cy˜) =
n∑
k=1
p˜ki (e˜)u(y˜k)− c(e˜i)
= Πi(e¯, C
∗
y ) + p
1
i (e¯)(u(y1 + δ)− u(y1))
+ pni (e¯)(u(yn − δ)− u(yn)) + c(e¯i)− c(e˜i)
≥ u(yn) + p1i (e¯)(u(y1 + δ)− u(y1))
+ pni (e¯)(u(yn − δ)− u(yn)) + c(e¯i)− c(e˜i)
≥ u(yn − δ) = u(y˜n) ≥ Πi((ei, e˜−i), Cy˜),
where the second inequality holds because
u(yn) + p
n
i (e¯)(u(yn − δ)− u(yn)) ≥ u(yn − δ)
for all i ∈ I, with strict inequality for j. Hence Cy˜ implements e˜.
When studying the set of all contest solutions to (P), we thus need to consider only
pure-strategy effort profiles e¯ and contests Cy with yn = 0. Fix a sum of prizes x ∈ [0, T¯ ].
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Let ex be the (unique) effort level that solves
n− 1
n
u
(
x
n− 1
)
− c(ex) = 0.
Note that, by the assumptions on u and c, the solution ex is differentiable, strictly increasing
and strictly concave in x. We now claim that nex is an upper bound on the sum of
efforts implementable with a contest Cy that has
∑n
k=1 yk = x and yn = 0, and it can be
reached only by implementing the symmetric effort profile (ex, ..., ex). Suppose first that
Cy implements an effort profile e¯ with
∑n
i=1 e¯i ≥ nex but e¯ 6= (ex, . . . , ex). Note that
Πi(e¯, Cy) =
n∑
k=1
pki (e¯)u(yk)− c(e¯i) ≥ u(yn)− c(0) = 0,
because Cy implements e¯. Summing these inequalities over all agents we obtain
n∑
i=1
n∑
k=1
pki (e¯)u(yk)−
n∑
i=1
c(e¯i) =
n−1∑
k=1
u(yk)−
n∑
i=1
c(e¯i) ≥ 0.
However, due to weak concavity of u and strict convexity of c we also have
n−1∑
k=1
u(yk)−
n∑
i=1
c(e¯i) < (n− 1)u
(
x
n− 1
)
− nc(ex) = 0,
a contradiction. Observe next that (ex, . . . , ex) can indeed be implemented. For instance,
let y = (x/(n − 1), . . . , x/(n − 1), 0) and choose the rules of Cy as follows. If the effort
profile is (ex, . . . , ex), then the prizes are allocated randomly and uniformly across the
agents. If some agent i unilaterally deviates from (ex, . . . , ex), then agent i receives the
prize 0, while each other agent receives x/(n− 1). Otherwise, the allocation of prizes can
be chosen arbitrarily. It follows immediately from the definition of ex that this contest
indeed implements (ex, . . . , ex).
Given any sum of prizes x, the highest payoff that the principal can achieve is thus
given by ΠP (x) = nex − x, and the problem is reduced to a choice of x ∈ [0, T¯ ]. Since ΠP
is continuous in x, it follows that a solution exists. Furthermore, since ΠP is differentiable
and strictly concave, the first-order condition ∂ΠP/∂x = 0 that is stated in part (i) of the
theorem uniquely characterizes a value x¯ > 0 (given the assumptions on u and c), and the
optimal value of x is given by x∗ = min{x¯, T¯}. The resulting implemented optimal effort
level is then given by e∗ = ex∗ .
We complete the proof of the only-if-statement by showing that any optimal contest has
the profile of prizes y = (x∗/(n− 1), . . . , x∗/(n− 1), 0) whenever u is strictly concave. By
contradiction, let Cy be a contest that implements (e∗, ..., e∗) with
∑n
k=1 yk = x
∗ and yn = 0
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but y1 6= yn−1. Proceeding as before, summing the inequalities Πi((e∗, . . . , e∗), Cy) ≥ 0
over all agents yields
∑n−1
k=1 u(yk)−nc(e∗) ≥ 0. Strict concavity of u, however, implies that∑n−1
k=1 u(yk)− nc(e∗) < (n− 1)u(x∗/(n− 1))− nc(e∗) = 0, a contradiction.
If-statement. We showed above that the upper bound on the principal’s payoff is given
by ne∗ − x∗. Thus, any contest which implements (e∗, ..., e∗) with the prize sum x∗ attains
the upper bound. 
A.3 Proof of Corollary 1
Each optimal contest induces individual efforts of e∗ and pays a sum of x∗, as characterized
in Theorem 2. Now consider the principal’s first-best problem. If the agents’ efforts were
directly observable and verifiable, then the principal could ask for individual efforts of e and
would have to compensate the agents with a transfer sum x such that u(x/n) − c(e) = 0.
Put differently, for a given transfer sum x the maximal achievable individual effort is
ex = c−1
(
u
(x
n
))
,
and the first-best problem is to maximize nex − x by choice of x ∈ [0, T¯ ]. With the same
arguments as in the proof of Theorem 2, this yields xFB = min{x˜, T¯}, where x˜ is given by
u′
(
x˜
n
)
= c′
(
c−1
(
u
(
x˜
n
)))
.
The resulting optimal effort level is
eFB = c−1
(
u
(
xFB
n
))
.
Now suppose that the agents are risk-neutral, i.e., the function u is linear. The conditions
characterizing (e∗, x∗) in Theorem 2 then coincide with those characterizing (eFB, xFB)
above, which implies (e∗, x∗) = (eFB, xFB). Then suppose that the agents are risk-averse,
i.e., the function u is strictly concave. If x∗ 6= xFB there is nothing to prove. Hence assume
x∗ = xFB. Inspection of the conditions that define e∗ and eFB then immediately reveals
that e∗ < eFB. 
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B Appendix – Not For Print
B.1 Proof of Theorem 3
The proof proceeds in two steps. Step 1 shows that (e∗, . . . , e∗) is an equilibrium of the
contest C∗y described in the theorem. Step 2 shows that no other equilibria exist. The
structure of the arguments in Step 2 is reminiscent of equilibrium characterization proofs
in all-pay auctions with or without caps (e.g. Baye, Kovenock, and De Vries, 1996, or Che
and Gale, 1998). Throughout the proof, we adopt the interpretation of a non-physical cap,
so efforts ei > e∗ are possible but are not differentiated by the reviewer. The result then
also follows for the case where e∗ is a physical bound on efforts.
Step 1. Consider deviations e′i of agent i from (e∗, . . . , e∗). If e′i > e∗, we obtain
Πi((e
∗, . . . , e∗), C∗y ) =
n− 1
n
u
(
x∗
n− 1
)
− c(e∗)
>
n− 1
n
u
(
x∗
n− 1
)
− c(e′i)
= Πi((e
∗, . . . , e′i, . . . , e
∗), C∗y ).
If e′i < e∗, we obtain
Πi((e
∗, . . . , e∗), C∗y ) =
n− 1
n
u
(
x∗
n− 1
)
− c(e∗)
= 0 ≥ −c(e′i) = Πi((e∗, . . . , e′i, . . . , e∗), C∗y ).
Thus, the contest C∗y implements the effort profile (e∗, ..., e∗).
Step 2. By contradiction, suppose C∗y also implements some other profile σ 6= (e∗, . . . , e∗).
Denote the support of σi by Li, so ei ∈ Li if and only if every open neighbourhood N of ei
satisfies σi(N) > 0. We first show that it must be that Li ⊆ [0, e∗] for all i ∈ I. Suppose not,
so there exists an agent i and an effort level ei > e∗ such that σi((ei−, ei+)) > 0 ∀ > 0.
Fix ¯ > 0 such that ei − ¯ > e∗. Note that the expected payoff of agent i playing e′i ≥ e∗
with probability one, while the other agents play σ−i, is
Πi(e
′
i, σ−i) =
[
1−
∏
j 6=i
σj([e
∗,∞)) +
∏
j 6=i
σj([e
∗,∞))n− 1
n
]
u
(
x∗
n− 1
)
− c(e′i).
where we omit the dependence on C∗y to simplify notation. Since c is strictly increasing,
we have Πi(e∗, σ−i) > Πi(e′i, σ−i) for all e′i > e∗. Hence Πi(e∗, σ−i) > Πi(e¯i, σ−i) for all
e¯i ∈ (ei− ¯, ei + ¯). Since σi((ei− ¯, ei + ¯)) > 0, agent i could strictly increase his expected
payoff by shifting the mass from this interval to e∗. Thus, σ is not an equilibrium. From
now on, we only consider the cases where Li ⊆ [0, e∗] ∀i ∈ I. Let ei = minLi. Since the
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proposed profile σ is different from (e∗, ..., e∗), it must be that e = mini∈I ei < e∗.
First, suppose that e > 0. Furthermore suppose that σj({e}) > 0 for exactly one agent
j ∈ I, or that σi({e}) = 0 for all i ∈ I. In the latter case let j be such that ej = e. Then
there exists some ¯ > 0 such that
Πj(e+ , σ−j) ≤
[
1−
∏
i 6=j
σi((e+ ,∞))
]
u
(
x∗
n− 1
)
− c(e+ ) < 0
for all  < ¯. Intuitively, the probability that agent j wins a positive prize approaches
zero as  approaches zero (by right continuity of σi((e + ,∞)) in  and σi((e,∞)) = 1),
while the cost of effort at e is strictly positive. Hence agent j could strictly increase his
expected payoff by shifting the mass σj([e, e + ¯)) > 0 from [e, e + ¯) to 0. Next suppose
that σi({e}) > 0 for at least two agents i = j, k. Then there exists a small  > 0 such that
Πj(e, σ−j) ≤
[
1−
(
1− 1
2
σk({e})
) ∏
i 6=j,k
σi((e,∞))
]
u
(
x∗
n− 1
)
− c(e)
<
[
1−
∏
i 6=j
σi((e,∞))
]
u
(
x∗
n− 1
)
− c(e+ )
≤ Πj(e+ , σ−j).
The intuition is that a small upward deviation from e increases the probability of winning
discretely, while marginally increasing the effort costs. Hence agent j could strictly increase
his expected payoff by shifting the mass σj({e}) > 0 from e to e + . We conclude that
there does not exist an equilibrium σ 6= (e∗, ..., e∗) with e > 0.
Second, suppose that e = 0. Consider first the case where σi({0}) = 0 for all i ∈ I,
that is, no agent places an atom on 0. If there is an agent j such that ek > 0 for all k 6= j,
then there exists some ¯ > 0 such that Πj(, σ−j) = −c() for all  < ¯. Agent j could
then strictly increase his expected payoff by shifting the mass σj((0, ¯)) > 0 from (0, ¯) to
0. Thus, there have to be at least two agents j and k with ej = ek = 0. But in this case,
observe that
Πj(, σ−j) ≤
[(
1−
∏
i 6=j
σi((,∞))
)
u
(
x∗
n− 1
)
− c()
]
and
lim
→0
[(
1−
∏
i 6=j
σi((,∞))
)
u
(
x∗
n− 1
)
− c()
]
= 0.
Thus for every Π¯ > 0 there exists ¯ > 0 such that Πj(, σ−j) < Π¯ for all  < ¯. Intuitively,
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both the probability of winning and the costs approach zero as → 0. However, it must be
that Πj(e∗, σ−j) > 0 since Πj(e∗, . . . , e∗) = 0 and the probability that j wins a positive prize
is strictly greater if the other agents play σ−j, because at least agent k exerts efforts lower
than e∗ with strictly positive probability. Hence agent j could strictly increase his expected
payoff by shifting the mass σj((0, ¯)) > 0 from (0, ¯) to e∗, for some sufficiently small ¯ > 0.
The only remaining case is σj({0}) > 0 for at least one agent j ∈ I. Observe that there can
only be one such agent, since otherwise a small upward deviation from 0 would lead to a
discrete increase in the probability of winning a positive prize, analogous to the argument
above. Then it must be that Πj(σj, σ−j) = 0 since Πj(0, σ−j) = 0. This can only be the
maximum payoff of agent j if all other agents exert deterministic efforts equal to e∗, since
otherwise Πj(e∗, σ−j) > 0. In this case, agent j is indifferent between playing 0 or e∗, and
all other effort levels yield strictly lower payoffs. This implies σj({0}) +σj({e∗}) = 1. Now
consider an agent k 6= j. Observe that a deviation by agent k to some  with 0 <  < e∗
leads to payoffs
Πk(, σ−k) = σj({0})u
(
x∗
n− 1
)
− c().
Thus a sufficiently small  > 0 will be a profitable deviation whenever
σj({0})u
(
x∗
n− 1
)
> σj({0})u
(
x∗
n− 1
)
+ (1− σj({0}))n− 1
n
u
(
x∗
n− 1
)
− c(e∗).
This can be reformulated to
0 > −σj({0})n− 1
n
u
(
x∗
n− 1
)
,
which always holds because σj({0}) > 0. 
B.2 Proof of Theorem 4
Consider a nested contest with prize profile y = (x∗/(n − 1), ..., x∗/(n − 1), 0) and the
general success function (1). We will show that, for an appropriate choice of f , the effort
profile (e∗, . . . , e∗) is an equilibrium. The proof proceeds in three steps. In Step 1, we derive
the agents’ payoff function in the nested contest. Step 2 introduces the specific value r∗(n)
stated in the theorem. In Step 3, we then complete the proof that the resulting contest
indeed implements the desired effort profile.
Step 1. Let p(ei) denote the probability that agent i wins none of the n − 1 positive
prizes, given that all other agents exert effort e∗. Furthermore, let u∗ be the utility derived
from a positive prize. Then, the expected payoff of agent i, when all other agents exert e∗,
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is given by
Πi(ei) = [1− p(ei)]u∗ − c(ei)
=
[
1− (n− 1)!f(e
∗)n−1∏n−1
k=1 [f(ei) + (n− k)f(e∗))]
]
u∗ − c(ei)
=
[
1−
n−1∏
k=1
(n− k)f(e∗)
[f(ei) + (n− k)f(e∗))]
]
u∗ − c(ei)
=
[
1−
n−1∏
k=1
(n− k)f(e∗)
[f(ei) + (n− k)f(e∗))]
](
n
n− 1
)
c(e∗)− c(ei).
Now suppose f(ei) = c(ei)r for some r ≥ 0. It is easy to see that Πi(0) = Πi(e∗) = 0 for
any r. We will show in the next two steps that Πi(ei) ≤ 0 for all ei when r = r∗(n) =
(n − 1)/(Hn − 1), where Hn =
∑n
k=1 1/k is the n-th harmonic number. This implies that
(e∗, . . . , e∗) is an equilibrium.
Step 2. Consider any ei > 0 (we already know the value of Πi for ei = 0). To determine
the sign of Πi(ei), we can equivalently examine the sign of
Πi(ei)
[
n− 1
nc(e∗)
]
=
[
1−
n−1∏
k=1
(n− k)c(e∗)r
[c(ei)r + (n− k)c(e∗)r)]
]
−
(
n− 1
n
)
c(ei)
c(e∗)
.
Make the change of variables y∗ = c(e∗)r and y = c(ei)r to obtain
F (y|r) =
[
1−
n−1∏
k=1
(n− k)y∗
[y + (n− k)y∗]
]
− n− 1
n
(
y
y∗
)1
r
.
After the additional variable substitution x = y∗/y we obtain
F (x|r) =
[
1−
n−1∏
k=1
(n− k)x
[1 + (n− k)x]
]
− n− 1
n
(
1
x
)1
r
.
Showing that F (x|r) ≤ 0 for all x > 0, x 6= 1, is then sufficient to ensure that the contest
with parameter r implements the optimum.
Fix any x and let us look for r(x) such that F (x|r(x)) = 0. Since F is strictly increasing
in r whenever x ∈ (0, 1), we obtain that F (x|r) ≤ 0 for any fixed x ∈ (0, 1) whenever
r ≤ r(x), so r(x) gives an upper bound on the possible values of r. Similarly, since F
is strictly decreasing in r whenever x ∈ (1,∞), we obtain that F (x|r) ≤ 0 for any fixed
x ∈ (1,∞) whenever r ≥ r(x), so r(x) gives a lower bound on the possible values of r.
Thus it is sufficient to find a value r∗ such that r(x) ≥ r∗ for all x ∈ (0, 1) and r(x) ≤ r∗
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for all x ∈ (1,∞).
Rewriting the equation F (x|r(x)) = 0, we have
[
1−
n−1∏
k=1
(n− k)x
[1 + (n− k)x]
]
=
n− 1
n
(
1
x
) 1
r(x)
log
[
1−
n−1∏
k=1
(n− k)x
[1 + (n− k)x]
]
= log
(
n− 1
n
)
− 1
r(x)
log(x)
1
r(x)
log(x) = log
(
n− 1
n
)
− log
[
1− (n− 1)!x
n−1∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]
]
1
r(x)
log(x) = log
[
n− 1
n
∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]− (n− 1)!xn−1
]
r(x) =
log(x)
log
[
n− 1
n
∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]− (n− 1)!xn−1
]
.
Denote
g(x) =
n− 1
n
∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]− (n− 1)!xn−1
so that
r(x) =
log(x)
log(g(x))
.
Note that g(x) > 0 for any x > 0. We will first show that limx↗1 r(x) = limx↘1 r(x) =
r∗(n) = (n − 1)/(Hn − 1). Note that for x = 1 both the denominator and the numerator
of r(x) equal zero. Hence we use l’Hôpital’s rule. Observe that
(log(g(x)))′ =
g′(x)
g(x)
=
(
∂
∂x
∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]
)(∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]− (n− 1)!xn−1
)
(∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]− (n− 1)!xn−1
)∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]
−
(∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]
) ∂
∂x
(∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]− (n− 1)!xn−1
)
(∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]− (n− 1)!xn−1
)∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]
=
(∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]
) ∂
∂x
((n− 1)!xn−1)(∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]− (n− 1)!xn−1
)∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]
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−
((n− 1)!xn−1)
(
∂
∂x
∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]
)
(∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]− (n− 1)!xn−1
)∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]
=
(∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]
)
(n− 1) ((n− 1)!xn−2)(∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]− (n− 1)!xn−1
)∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]
−
((n− 1)!xn−1)
(∑n−1
k=1(n− k)
∏
j 6=k [1 + (n− j)x]
)
(∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]− (n− 1)!xn−1
)∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]
.
We evaluate this at x = 1, that is,
(log(g(x)))′|x=1 =
(∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)]
)
(n− 1)(n− 1)!(∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)]− (n− 1)!
)∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)]
−
(n− 1)!
(∑n−1
k=1(n− k)
∏
j 6=k [1 + (n− j)]
)
(∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)]− (n− 1)!
)∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)]
=
n!(n− 1)(n− 1)!
(n!− (n− 1)!)n!
−
(n− 1)!
(∑n−1
k=1(n− k)
∏
j 6=k [1 + (n− j)]
)
(n!− (n− 1)!)n!
= 1−
(∑n−1
k=1(n− k)
∏
j 6=k [1 + (n− j)]
)
(n− 1)n!
= 1−
n!
(∑n−1
k=1
n− k
n− k + 1
)
(n− 1)n!
=
n− 1−
(∑n−1
k=1
n− k
n− k + 1
)
n− 1
=
1 +
∑n−1
k=1
n− k + 1
n− k + 1 −
∑n−1
k=1
n− k
n− k + 1 − 1
n− 1
=
1 +
∑n−1
k=1
1
n− k + 1 − 1
n− 1
=
Hn − 1
n− 1 .
Thus we have
lim
x↗1
r(x) = lim
x↘1
r(x) =
1/x
(log(g(x)))′
∣∣∣∣
x=1
=
n− 1
Hn − 1 .
To complete the proof of the theorem, it is now sufficient to show that r(x) is weakly
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monotonically decreasing on (0, 1) and on (1,∞). We will do this in the next step.
Step 3. To show monotonicity of r(x), we will apply a suitable version of the l’Hôpital
montone rule. Proposition 1.1 in Pinelis (2002) (together with Corollary 1.2 and Remark
1.3) implies that r(x) = log(x)/ log(g(x)) is weakly decreasing on (0, 1) and (1,∞) if
(log(x))′
(log(g(x)))′
=
g(x)
xg′(x)
is weakly decreasing.30 We will thus show that(
g(x)
xg′(x)
)′
=
[g′(x)x− g(x)]g′(x)− xg(x)g′′(x)
(xg′(x))2
≤ 0.
For this, it is sufficient to show the following three conditions:
(a) g′(x) > 0,
(b) g′′(x) ≥ 0,
(c) g′(x)x− g(x) ≤ 0.
We will verify these conditions in the following three lemmas. To do this, consider the
function g. We can write
n−1∏
k=1
[1 + (n− k)x] = (n− 1)!xn−1 + an−2xn−2 + an−3xn−3 + · · ·+ a1x+ 1
= (n− 1)!xn−1 + γ(x),
where a1, . . . , an−2 are strictly positive coefficients (that depend on n), so that γ is a
polynomial of degree n− 2 which is strictly positive for all x > 0.31 We can then rewrite
g(x) =
n− 1
n
(n− 1)!xn−1 + γ(x)
γ(x)
.
Lemma 7 Condition g′(x) > 0 is satisfied.
Proof. Observe that
g′(x) =
n− 1
n
(n− 1)(n− 1)!xn−2γ(x)− (n− 1)!xn−1γ′(x)
γ(x)2
=
n− 1
n
(n− 1)!xn−2[(n− 1)γ(x)− xγ′(x)]
γ(x)2
,
30Proposition 1.1 is applicable because log(x) and log(g(x)) are differentiable on the respective intervals
and limx→1 log(x) = limx→1 log(g(x)) = 0 holds. The remaining prerequisite (log(g(x)))′ = g′(x)/g(x) > 0
also holds, because g(x) > 0 and g′(x) > 0 according to Lemma 7 below.
31To avoid confusion, the formula should be read as γ(x) = 1 for n = 2 and as γ(x) = a1x for n = 3.
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and, since
(n− 1)γ(x) = (n− 1)an−2xn−2 + (n− 1)an−3xn−3 + . . .+ (n− 1)a1x+ n− 1 and
xγ′(x) = (n− 2)an−2xn−2 + (n− 3)an−3xn−3 + . . .+ a1x,
it follows that (n− 1)γ(x)− xγ′(x) > 0, which implies that g′(x) > 0. 
Lemma 8 Condition g′′(x) ≥ 0 is satisfied.
Proof. Observe that
g′′(x) =
(n− 1)(n− 1)!
n
[
(n− 1)xn−2γ(x)− xn−1γ′(x)
γ(x)2
]′
,
so that g′′(x) ≥ 0 is equivalent to
0 ≤
[
(n− 1)xn−2γ(x)− xn−1γ′(x)
γ(x)2
]′
=
[(n− 2)(n− 1)xn−3γ(x) + (n− 1)xn−2γ′(x)− (n− 1)xn−2γ′(x)− xn−1γ′′(x)]γ(x)2
γ(x)4
− [(n− 1)x
n−2γ(x)− xn−1γ′(x)]2γ(x)γ′(x)
γ(x)4
=
[(n− 2)(n− 1)xn−3γ(x)− xn−1γ′′(x)]γ(x)2
γ(x)4
− [(n− 1)x
n−2γ(x)− xn−1γ′(x)]2γ(x)γ′(x)
γ(x)4
=
γ(x)xn−3
γ(x)4
[
(n− 2)(n− 1)γ(x)2 − x2γ′′(x)γ(x)− 2(n− 1)xγ(x)γ′(x) + 2x2γ′(x)2] .
The expression in the square bracket is a polynomial of degree (2n − 4). We will show
that all coefficients of this polynomial are positive, which implies that the polynomial, and
hence also g′′(x), is non-negative.
Using the auxiliary definitions a0 = 1 and aκ = 0 for κ < 0, the coefficient multiplying
x2n−j in this polynomial, for any 4 ≤ j ≤ 2n, is given by
j−2∑
k=2
(n− 2)(n− 1)an−kan−j+k −
j−2∑
k=2
(n− k)(n− k − 1)an−kan−j+k
−
j−2∑
k=2
2(n− 1)(n− k)an−kan−j+k +
j−2∑
k=2
2(n− k)(n− j + k)an−kan−j+k
=
j−2∑
k=2
(n2 − 3n+ 2)an−kan−j+k −
j−2∑
k=2
(n2 − 2nk − n+ k2 + k)an−kan−j+k
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−
j−2∑
k=2
2(n2 − nk − n+ k)an−kan−j+k +
j−2∑
k=2
2(n2 − nj + jk − k2)an−kan−j+k
=
j−2∑
k=2
(2 + 4nk − 3k2 − 3k − 2nj + 2jk)an−kan−j+k.
Let ϕ(n, j, k) = 2 + 4nk − 3k2 − 3k − 2nj + 2jk. We will show in several steps that∑j−2
k=2 ϕ(n, j, k)an−kan−j+k ≥ 0. For n = 2 and n = 3, this condition can easily be verified
directly. Hence we suppose that n > 3 from now on.
Observe that for any k there is k′ = j − k such that an−kan−j+k = an−k′an−j+k′ . Hence
we first consider the case where j is odd, so that we can write
j−2∑
k=2
ϕ(n, j, k)an−kan−j+k =
j−1
2∑
k=2
[ϕ(n, j, k) + ϕ(n, j, j − k)]an−kan−j+k.
Since ϕ(n, j, k) + ϕ(n, j, j − k) is an integer, we can think of this expression as a long
sum where each of the terms an−kan−j+k appears exactly |ϕ(n, j, k) + ϕ(n, j, j − k)| times,
added or subtracted depending on the sign of ϕ(n, j, k) + ϕ(n, j, j − k). Now note that∑(j−1)/2
k=2 [ϕ(n, j, k) + ϕ(n, j, j − k)] = 0 holds. This follows because we can write
j−1
2∑
k=2
[ϕ(n, j, k) + ϕ(n, j, j − k)]
=
j−2∑
k=2
ϕ(n, j, k)
=
j−2∑
k=2
(2− 2nj) + (4n− 3 + 2j)
j−2∑
k=2
k − 3
j−2∑
k=2
k2
= (j − 3)(2− 2nj) + (4n− 3 + 2j)j(j − 3)
2
− 3(j − 3)(2j
2 − 3j + 4)
6
= (j − 3)
(
2− 2nj + 2nj − 3j
2
+ j2 − j2 + 3j
2
− 2
)
= 0.
Thus, for each instance where a term an−k′an−j+k′ is subtracted in the long sum, we can
find a term an−k′′an−j+k′′ which is added. We claim that the respective terms which are
added are weakly larger than the terms which are subtracted. This claim follows once we
show that both ϕ(n, j, k) +ϕ(n, j, j − k) and an−kan−j+k are weakly increasing in k within
the range of the sum. In that case, the terms which are subtracted are those for small k
and the terms which are added are those for large k, and the latter are weakly larger. The
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same argument in fact applies when j is even, so that we can write
j−2∑
k=2
ϕ(n, j, k)an−kan−j+k
=
j−2
2∑
k=2
[ϕ(n, j, k) + ϕ(n, j, j − k)]an−kan−j+k + ϕ(n, j, j/2)a2n−j/2.
Importantly, for the last term we have
ϕ(n, j, j/2) = 2− 2nj − 3
(
j
2
)2
+
j
2
(4n− 3 + 2j)
= 2− j2 3
4
− j 3
2
+ j2
= 2 + j
(
j
4
− 3
2
)
> 0,
so that the last and largest term a2n−j/2 = an−j/2an−j/2 is indeed also added.
We first show that ϕ(n, j, k) + ϕ(n, j, j − k) is weakly increasing in k in the relevant
range. We have
ϕ(n, j, k) + ϕ(n, j, j − k)
= (2− 2nj − 3k2 + k(4n− 3 + 2j)) + (2− 2nj − 3(j − k)2 + (j − k)(4n− 3 + 2j))
= 4− 4nj − 3(2k2 + j2 − 2jk) + j(4n− 3 + 2j).
Treating k as a real variable, we obtain
∂
∂k
[ϕ(n, j, k) + ϕ(n, j, j − k)] = −3(4k − 2j)
= −6(2k − j) > 0
for all k < j/2, so the claim follows.
We now show that an−kan−j+k is weakly increasing in k in the relevant range. Formally,
we show that an−kan−j+k ≤ an−k−1an−j+k+1 for any k < j/2. Observe that we can write
a1 =
n−1∑
k1=1
(n− k1),
a2 =
n−2∑
k2=1
n−1∑
k1=k2+1
(n− k2)(n− k1),
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...
aj =
n−j∑
kj=1
n−j+1∑
kj−1=kj+1
· · ·
n−1∑
k1=k2+1
(n− kj)(n− kj−1) . . . (n− k1).
Intuitively, each summand in the definition of aj is the product of j different elements
chosen from the set {(n − 1), (n − 2), . . . , 1}, and the nested summation goes over all the
different possibilities in which these j elements can be chosen. Using simplified notation
for the nested summation, we can thus write (where α, β, λ, and η take the role of the
indices of summation, like k in the expression above):
an−k =
∑
(n− αn−k)(n− αn−k−1) . . . (n− α1),
an−j+k =
∑
(n− βn−j+k)(n− βn−j+k−1) . . . (n− β1),
an−k−1 =
∑
(n− λn−k−1)(n− λn−k−2) . . . (n− λ1),
an−j+k+1 =
∑
(n− ηn−j+k+1)(n− ηn−j+k) . . . (n− η1).
Rewriting the inequality an−kan−j+k ≤ an−k−1an−j+k+1 using this notation, we obtain∑
(n− αn−k)(n− αn−k−1) . . . (n− α1)(n− βn−j+k)(n− βn−j+k−1) . . . (n− β1)
≤
∑
(n− λn−k−1)(n− λn−k−2) . . . (n− λ1)(n− ηn−j+k+1)(n− ηn−j+k) . . . (n− η1).
Observe that each summand of the LHS sum is the product of (n−k)+(n−j+k) = 2n−j
elements, all of them chosen from the set {(n− 1), (n− 2), . . . , 1}. The first n− k elements
are all different from each other, and the last n − j + k elements are all different from
each other. Thus, since n − k > n − j + k when k < j/2, in each summand at most
n− j+ k elements can appear twice. Furthermore, the LHS sum goes over all the different
combinations that satisfy this property. Similarly, each summand of the RHS sum is the
product of (n − k − 1) + (n − j + k + 1) = 2n − j elements, all of them chosen from the
same set {(n− 1), (n− 2), . . . , 1}. The first n− k − 1 elements are all different from each
other, and the last n− j + k+ 1 elements are all different from each other. Thus, (weakly)
more than n− j + k elements can appear twice in these summands.32 Since the RHS sum
goes over all the different combinations that satisfy this property, for each summand on the
LHS there exists an equal summand on the RHS. This shows that the inequality indeed
holds. 
Lemma 9 Condition g′(x)x− g(x) ≤ 0 is satisfied.
32The inequality n−k−1 ≥ n− j+k+1 can be rearranged to k ≤ j/2−1, which follows from k < j/2,
except if j is odd and k = (j − 1)/2. Thus, typically, up to n− j + k+1 elements can appear twice. If j is
odd and k = (j − 1)/2, up to n− k − 1 elements can appear twice, which is identical to n− j + k in that
case.
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Proof. We have
g′(x)x− g(x) = n− 1
n
[
(n− 1)!xn−1[(n− 1)γ(x)− xγ′(x)]
γ(x)2
− (n− 1)!x
n−1 + γ(x)
γ(x)
]
,
and therefore g′(x)x− g(x) ≤ 0 if and only if
0 ≥ (n− 1)!xn−1[(n− 1)γ(x)− xγ′(x)]− (n− 1)!xn−1γ(x)− γ(x)2
= (n− 1)!xn−1(n− 2)γ(x)− (n− 1)!xnγ′(x)− γ(x)2
= (n− 1)![(n− 2)an−2x2n−3 + (n− 2)an−3x2n−4 + · · ·+ (n− 2)a1xn + (n− 2)xn−1
− (n− 2)an−2x2n−3 − (n− 3)an−3x2n−4 − · · · − a1xn]− γ(x)2
= (n− 1)![an−3x2n−4 + 2an−4x2n−5 + · · ·+ (n− 3)a1xn + (n− 2)xn−1]− γ(x)2
= (n− 1)![an−3x2n−4 + 2an−4x2n−5 + · · ·+ (n− 3)a1xn + (n− 2)xn−1]
−
n+1∑
j=4
j−2∑
k=2
an−kan−j+kx2n−j − ρ,
where ρ ≥ 0 is some positive remainder of γ(x)2. To show g′(x)x− g(x) ≤ 0, it is therefore
sufficient to ignore ρ and show that the overall coefficient on x2n−j in the last expression is
not positive. That is, it is sufficient to show that, for all j ∈ {4, . . . , n+ 1},
(n− 1)!(j − 3)an−j+1 −
j−2∑
k=2
an−kan−j+k ≤ 0.
Observe that the sum has exactly (j − 3) elements. Then, it is sufficient to show that, for
all k ∈ {2, . . . , j − 2},
(n− 1)!an−j+1 ≤ an−kan−j+k. (3)
To demonstrate condition (3), we will first write the values of the coefficients aj in a
different way. Instead of summing over all possibilities in which j different elements from
the set {(n− 1), (n− 2), . . . , 1} can be chosen, we can sum over the n− j − 1 elements not
chosen, and divide the factorial (n− 1)! by the product of these elements. This yields
an−2 =
n−1∑
k1=1
(n− 1)!
n− k1 ,
an−3 =
n−2∑
k2=1
n−1∑
k1=k2+1
(n− 1)!
(n− k2)(n− k1) ,
...
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an−j =
n−j+1∑
kj−1=1
n−j+2∑
kj−2=kj−1+1
· · ·
n−1∑
k1=k2+1
(n− 1)!
(n− kj−1)(n− kj−2) . . . (n− k1) ,
...
a1 =
2∑
kn−2=1
3∑
kn−3=kn−2+1
· · ·
n−1∑
k1=k2+1
(n− 1)!
(n− kn−2)(n− kn−3) . . . (n− k1) .
Rewriting condition (3), we then have
n−j+2∑
λj−2=1
n−j+3∑
λj−3=λj−2+1
· · ·
n−1∑
λ1=λ2+1
((n− 1)!)2
(n− λj−2)(n− λj−3) . . . (n− λ1)
≤
n−k+1∑
αk−1=1
n−k+2∑
αk−2=αk−1+1
· · ·
n−1∑
α1=α2+1
(n− 1)!
(n− αk−1)(n− αk−2) . . . (n− α1)

×
n−j+k+1∑
βj−k−1=1
n−j+k+2∑
βj−k−2=βj−k−1+1
· · ·
n−1∑
β1=β2+1
(n− 1)!
(n− βj−k−1)(n− βj−k−2) . . . (n− β1)
 .
Observe that for each summand on the LHS, the denominator is a product of j−2 different
elements from the set {(n−1), (n−2), . . . , 1}. In fact, the LHS sum goes over all the different
possibilities in which these j−2 elements can be chosen. On the RHS, after multiplication,
the denominator of each summand is a product of (k−1)+(j−k−1) = j−2 elements from
the same set, where replication of some elements may be possible (but is not necessary).
Since the RHS sum goes over all these different possibilities, for each summand on the LHS
there exists an equal summand on the RHS. This shows that the inequality holds.  
B.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Observe first that c(e∗)/c′(e∗) < e∗ holds due to strict convexity of c and c(0) = 0. We can
therefore write the probability that agent 1 wins the prize in the described contest, holding
the effort e2 = e∗ fixed, as a piecewise function
p(e1) =

1 if e1 > e∗ + c(e
∗)
c′(e∗) ,
1
2
+ 1
2
c′(e∗)
c(e∗) (e1 − e∗) if e∗ − c(e
∗)
c′(e∗) ≤ e1 ≤ e∗ + c(e
∗)
c′(e∗) ,
0 if e1 < e∗ − c(e∗)c′(e∗) .
Then, the expected payoff of agent 1 is given by
Π1(e1) = p(e1)u
∗ − c(e1) = p(e1)2c(e∗)− c(e1).
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It follows that Π1(e∗) = 0. We now consider the three types of deviations from e∗.
Case 1: e1 < e∗ − c(e∗)/c′(e∗). It follows immediately that Π1(e1) ≤ 0 in this range,
which implies that these deviations are not profitable.
Case 2: e∗− c(e∗)/c′(e∗) ≤ e1 ≤ e∗+ c(e∗)/c′(e∗). Observe that Π′1(e1) = c′(e∗)− c′(e1)
in this range. Hence the first-order condition yields the unique solution e1 = e∗. Since
Π′′1(e1) = −c′′(e1) < 0, this is indeed the maximum over this range.
Case 3: e1 > e∗ + c(e∗)/c′(e∗). We have Π1(e1) < Π1(e∗ + c(e∗)/c′(e∗)) for this range.
Hence, by the arguments for the previous case, these deviations are not profitable either.
We conclude that e1 = e∗ is a best response to e2 = e∗. The argument for agent 2 is
symmetric, which implies that the contest implements (e∗, e∗). 
B.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose that the condition σ21 + σ22 − 2σ12 ≤ 2/(piβ2) is satisfied. Consider a contest as
described in the proposition. We proceed in two steps. Step 1 derives an expression for
agent i’s expected payoff as a function of the effort profile e. Step 2 shows that ei = e∗ is
a best response when agent j 6= i chooses ej = e∗.
Step 1. Given an effort profile e, the probability that agent 1 wins the prize is
p(e) = Pr
[
η˜e˜1
e˜2
≥ 1
]
= Pr
[
η˜η˜1e1
η˜2e2
≥ 1
]
= Pr
[
η˜2
η˜η˜1
≤ e1
e2
]
.
Since the variables η˜1, η˜2 and η˜ are log-normally distributed, it follows that the compound
variable η˜2/(η˜η˜1) is also log-normal, with location parameter ν = ν2−ν1−νη = 0 and scale
parameter σ2 = σ21 + σ22 − σ12 + σ2η = 2/(piβ2). The cdf of the log-normal distribution is
given by F (x) = Φ ((log x− ν)/σ), where Φ is the cdf of the standard normal distribution.
Thus we can write
p(e) = Φ
(
log(e1/e2)β
√
pi
2
)
.
For the probability that agent 2 wins the prize we obtain
1− p(e) = 1− Φ
(
log(e1/e2)β
√
pi
2
)
= Φ
(
− log(e1/e2)β
√
pi
2
)
= Φ
(
log(e2/e1)β
√
pi
2
)
.
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Hence the expected payoff of agent i = 1, 2 is
Πi(e) = Φ
(
log(ei/ej)β
√
pi
2
)
u∗ − c(ei)
= Φ
(
log(ei/ej)β
√
pi
2
)
2γe∗β − γeβi .
Step 2. Suppose ej = e∗ and consider the choice of agent i 6= j. We immediately obtain
Πi(e
∗, e∗) = 0. We will now show that Πi(ei, e∗) ≤ 0 always holds, i.e.,
Φ
(
log(ei/e
∗)β
√
pi
2
)
≤ 1
2
( ei
e∗
)β
for all ei ∈ R+. After the change of variables x = log(ei/e∗)β
√
pi/2 this becomes the
requirement that
Φ(x) ≤ 1
2
ex
√
2/pi (4)
for all x ∈ R. Inequality (4) is satisfied for x = 0, where LHS and RHS both take a value of
1/2. Furthermore, the LHS function and the RHS function are tangent at x = 0, because
their derivatives are both equal to 1/
√
2pi at this point. It then follows immediately that
inequality (4) is also satisfied for all x > 0, because the LHS is strictly concave in x in this
range, while the RHS is strictly convex. We now consider the remaining case where x < 0.
We use the fact that Φ(x) = erfc(−x/√2)/2, where
erfc(y) =
2√
pi
∫ ∞
y
e−t
2
dt
is the complementary error function (see e.g. Chang, Cosman, and Milstein, 2011). After
the change of variables y = −x/√2 we thus need to verify
erfc(y) ≤ e−2y/
√
pi (5)
for all y > 0. Inequality (5) is satisfied for y = 0, where LHS and RHS both take a value
of 1. Now observe that the derivative of the LHS with respect to y is given by −2e−y2/√pi,
while the derivative of the RHS is −2e−2y/√pi/√pi. The condition that the former is weakly
smaller than the latter can be rearranged to y ≤ 2/√pi, which implies that (5) is satisfied for
0 < y ≤ 2/√pi. For larger values of y, we can use a Chernoff bound for the complementary
error function. Theorem 1 in Chang et al. (2011) implies that
erfc(y) ≤ e−y2
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for all y ≥ 0. The inequality e−y2 ≤ e−2y/√pi can be rearranged to y ≥ 2/√pi. This implies
that (5) is satisfied also for y > 2/
√
pi, which completes the proof. 
B.5 Proof of Proposition 3
We first derive some results which hold under cost heterogeneity for any number of agents.
It is easy to see that Lemmas 1 to 4 continue to hold. Hence it is still without loss of
generality to consider a contract Φ = (µe)e∈E that does not screen θ, satisfies
Eµe
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
= x and Eµe
[
n∑
i=1
u(ti)
]
= xˆ
for all e ∈ E, and implements a possibly asymmetric pure effort profile e¯ = (e¯1, . . . , e¯n).
For any such contract, we obtain the following intermediate result.
Lemma 10 If a contract Φ implements a pure-strategy effort profile e¯ = (e¯1, . . . , e¯n), then
1
n− 1
n∑
i=1
ci(e¯i) ≤ u
(
x
n− 1
)
.
Proof. Since Φ implements e¯, for each i ∈ I it must hold that
ci(e¯i) ≤ Eµe¯ [u(ti)]− Eµ(0,e¯−i) [u(ti)] .
Summing over all i ∈ I, we obtain
n∑
i=1
ci(e¯i) ≤
n∑
i=1
Eµe¯ [u(ti)]−
n∑
i=1
Eµ(0,e¯−i) [u(ti)]
= xˆ−
(
xˆ−
n∑
i=2
Eµ(0,e¯−1) [u(ti)]
)
−
n∑
i=2
Eµ(0,e¯−i) [u(ti)]
≤
n∑
i=2
Eµ(0,e¯−1) [u(ti)]
≤
n∑
i=2
u
(
Eµ(0,e¯−1) [ti]
)
≤
n∑
i=2
u
(
x
n− 1
)
= (n− 1)u
(
x
n− 1
)
,
where the third inequality follows from concavity of u, and the fourth inequality follows
from concavity of u together with the fact that
∑n
i=2 Eµ(0,e¯−1) [ti] ≤ x. 
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For the special case of n = 2, we can now replace the previous Lemmas 5 and 6 by the
following result.
Lemma 11 Suppose n = 2. For every contract Φ that implements a pure-strategy effort
profile e¯, there exists a contest Cy that also implements e¯ and yields the same expected
payoff to the principal.
Proof. Suppose Φ implements e¯. By Lemma 10 it holds that c1(e¯1) + c2(e¯2) ≤ u(x), so in
particular ci(e¯i) ≤ u(x) for both i = 1, 2. We now construct a contest Cy with prize profile
y = (x, 0) that also implements e¯. The case where x = 0 and thus e¯1 = e¯2 = 0 is trivial, so
we focus on the case where x > 0.
The allocation rule of Cy is as follows. If e = e¯, the zero prize is given to agent i
with probability pi ≥ 0, while the other agent obtains the positive prize. Below we will
determine the values pi such that p1 + p2 = 1. If e = (ei, e¯−i) with ei 6= e¯i, the deviating
agent i obtains the zero prize for sure and the non-deviating agent obtains the positive
prize. For all other effort profiles e, the allocation of the prizes can be chosen arbitrarily.
Since Cy is a contest, it is credible.
For each agent i = 1, 2, first define p˜i implicitly by
(1− p˜i)u (x) = ci(e¯i).
Since the LHS of this equation describes the expected payoff of agent i who expects to
obtain the zero prize with probability p˜i, it follows that the contest Cy indeed implements
e¯ if pi ≤ p˜i holds for both i = 1, 2. The fact that ci(e¯i) ≤ u(x) guarantees p˜i ≥ 0 for both
i = 1, 2. Lemma 10 also implies that
2∑
i=1
ci(e¯i) =
2∑
i=1
(1− p˜i)u(x) = (2− p˜1 − p˜2)u(x) ≤ u(x),
which guarantees that p˜1 + p˜2 ≥ 1. It is therefore possible to find equilibrium punishment
probabilities pi such that 0 ≤ pi ≤ p˜i and p1 + p2 = 1.
Finally, from the above arguments we also obtain that the principal’s expected payoff
is e¯1 + e¯2 − x with both (e¯,Φ) and (e¯, Cy). 
Since the principal can achieve the same payoff with a contest as with any other con-
tract, it only remains to be shown that a solution to the principal’s problem exists in the
heterogeneous cost case. This will be established in the proof of Proposition 5 below. 
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B.6 Proof of Proposition 4
The proof proceeds in two steps. First, we state some properties that must be satisfied by
the optimal contract for any given profile of effort cost functions. Second, we prove the
main statement about the optimality of contests for large m.
Step 1. Fix any profile of cost functions (c1, . . . , cn). As argued in the proof of Proposi-
tion 3, we can restrict attention to non-screening contracts with expected sums of transfers
(x) and expected sums of utilities (xˆ) that are fixed across e ∈ E, and pure-strategy effort
profiles. The following result provides a lower bound on the principal’s maximal profits
within that class. Define the bound
Π = max
x∈[0,T¯ ]
[
c−11 (u(x))− x
]
,
which satisfies Π > 0 due to our assumptions on c1 and u.
Lemma 12 There exists a contest Cy that implements some effort profile e ∈ E such that
ΠP (e, Cy) = Π.
Proof. Let x∗ = arg maxx∈[0,T¯ ]
[
c−11 (u(x))− x
]
and e∗1 = c
−1
1 (u(x
∗)). Consider a contest
Cy with prize profile y = (x∗, 0, . . . , 0). If the effort profile e is such that e1 = e∗1, then
agent 1 receives the prize x∗ while all other agents receive a zero prize. For any other effort
profile, agent 2 receives x∗ and all other agents receive a zero prize. It follows immediately
that Cy implements (e∗1, 0, . . . , 0) and yields the payoff e∗1 − x∗ = Π to the principal. 
The next result is a direct generalization of Lemma 5 to the case of heterogeneous cost
functions. The proof proceeds exactly like the proof of Lemma 5 and is therefore omitted.
Lemma 13 For every contract Φ that implements a pure-strategy profile e¯ = (e¯1, ..., e¯n)
such that
1
n
n∑
i=1
ci(e¯i) > ck
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
e¯i
)
∀k ∈ I,
there exists a contract Φˆ that implements the pure-strategy profile eˆ = (eˆ1, ..., eˆn), where
eˆ1 = . . . = eˆn =
1
n
∑n
i=1 e¯i, and yields the same expected payoff to the principal.
To summarize, in the search for an optimal contract we can restrict attention to non-
screening contracts Φ with an expected sum of transfers x and an expected sum of utilities
xˆ that are fixed across all e ∈ E, and which implement a pure-strategy effort profile e¯ such
that ΠP (e¯,Φ) ≥ Π and
1
n
n∑
i=1
ci(e¯i) ≤ max
k∈I
ck
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
e¯i
)
. (6)
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Step 2. Consider any sequence (cm1 , . . . , cmn )m∈N where, for each agent i ∈ I, the
cost functions cmi converge uniformly to the common cost function c as m → ∞. Let
(e¯m,Φm)m∈N be an arbitrary sequence such that contract Φm implements effort profile e¯m =
(e¯m1 , . . . , e¯
m
n ) when the cost functions are (cm1 , . . . , cmn ). We will write eˆm = (1/n)
∑n
i=1 e¯
m
i
for the average effort at step m in the sequence. Without loss of generality, assume that
the conditions summarized at the end of Step 1 are satisfied for each m ∈ N.
Lemma 14 The sequence
κm = max
k∈I
cmk (e¯
m
k )−
1
n
n∑
i=1
cmi (e¯
m
i )
converges to zero as m→∞.
Proof. For every m ∈ N, let
δm = max
k∈I
cmk (eˆ
m)− 1
n
n∑
i=1
cmi (e¯
m
i ) and ψ
m = max
i∈I
cmi (e¯
m
i )−max
k∈I
cmk (eˆ
m),
and hence κm = δm + ψm. We will show that limm→∞ δm = limm→∞ ψm = 0, which
immediately implies that limm→∞ κm = 0.
For the sequence δm, note that
δm =
[
max
k∈I
cmk (eˆ
m)− c(eˆm)
]
+
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
c(e¯mi )−
1
n
n∑
i=1
cmi (e¯
m
i )
]
+
[
c(eˆm)− 1
n
n∑
i=1
c(e¯mi )
]
.
By uniform convergence of cmi to c, ∀i ∈ I, we have
lim
m→∞
(cmi (eˆ
m)− c(eˆm)) = 0 and lim
m→∞
(cmi (e¯
m
i )− c(e¯mi )) = 0 ∀i ∈ I, (7)
and thus
lim
m→∞
max
k∈I
(cmk (eˆ
m)− c(eˆm)) = 0 and lim
m→∞
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
cmi (e¯
m
i )−
1
n
n∑
i=1
c(e¯mi )
)
= 0.
In addition, by convexity of c we have c(eˆm) − 1
n
∑n
i=1 c(e¯
m
i ) ≤ 0 for all m ∈ N, and by
condition (6) we have δm ≥ 0 for all m ∈ N. Hence, we must also have
lim
m→∞
(
c(eˆm)− 1
n
n∑
i=1
c(e¯mi )
)
= 0, (8)
as otherwise for some large m we would have δm < 0, a contradiction. This concludes that
limm→∞ δm = 0.
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For the sequence ψm, we have
ψm = max
k∈I
(c(eˆm)− cmk (eˆm)) + max
i∈I
[cmi (e¯
m
i )− c(e¯mi ) + c(e¯mi )− c(eˆm)] .
Hence, by (7), a sufficient condition for limm→∞ ψm = 0 is
lim
m→∞
(c(e¯mi )− c(eˆm)) = 0 ∀i ∈ I. (9)
To establish (9), we first claim that there exists e˜ > 0 such that e¯mi ∈ [0, e˜] for all i ∈ I and
all m ∈ N. The fact that Φm implements e¯m implies cmi (e¯mi ) ≤ u(T¯ ) for all i ∈ I. Now fix
any u˜ > u(T¯ ). By uniform convergence of each cmi to c it follows that there exists m′ ∈ N
such that for all m ≥ m′,
|cmi (e¯mi )− c(e¯mi )| ≤ u˜− u(T¯ ) ∀i ∈ I,
which then implies c(e¯mi ) ≤ u˜ and therefore e¯mi ≤ c−1(u˜). Now just define e˜ as the maximum
among c−1(u˜) and the finite number of values e¯mi for all i ∈ I and m < m′. We next claim
that limm→∞(e¯mi − eˆm) = 0 holds for all i ∈ I. By contradiction, assume there exists
i ∈ I and  > 0 such that for all m′ ∈ N there exists m ≥ m′ so that |e¯mi − eˆm| ≥ .
Define Ei = {(e1, . . . , en) ∈ [0, e˜]n | |ei − 1n
∑n
j=1 ej| ≥ }. The set Ei is compact and the
function χ(e) = 1
n
∑n
j=1 c(ej) − c
(
1
n
∑n
j=1 ej
)
is continuous on Ei, with χ(e) > 0 due to
strict convexity of c and  > 0. Hence ˜ = mine∈Ei χ(e) exists and satisfies ˜ > 0. We
have thus shown that there exists ˜ > 0 such that for all m′ ∈ N there exists m ≥ m′
so that χ(e¯m) = −(c(eˆm) − 1
n
∑n
i=1 c(e¯
m
i )) ≥ ˜, contradicting (8). Finally, (9) now follows
immediately because e¯mi ∈ [0, e˜] and eˆm ∈ [0, e˜] and c is continuous on [0, e˜]. 
Next we show that the sum of effort costs is bounded away from zero for large m.
Lemma 15 There exist m′ ∈ N and c > 0 such that ∑ni=1 cmi (e¯mi ) ≥ c for all m ≥ m′.
Proof. Let Πm = maxx∈[0,T¯ ] Πm1 (x) with Π
m
1 (x) = (c
m
1 )
−1(u(x)) − x be the lower profit
bound for the cost functions (cm1 , . . . , cmn ) as defined in Step 1 of the proof. Hence we know
that ΠP (e¯m,Φm) ≥ Πm holds for all m ∈ N. Similarly, let Π∞ = maxx∈[0,T¯ ] Π1(x) with
Π1(x) = c
−1(u(x))− x be the bound when the cost functions are (c, . . . , c). We first claim
that limm→∞Πm = Π∞. The claim follows immediately once we show that Πm1 converges
uniformly to Π1 on [0, T¯ ]. Using Theorem 2 in Barvinek, Daler, and Francu (1991), it can
be shown that (cm1 )−1 converges uniformly to c−1 on [0, u(T¯ )].33 Thus for every  > 0 there
33 The theorem is directly applicable and implies our claim after we extend the functions c and cm1 to
R by defining cm1 (e) = c(e) = e for all e < 0.
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exists m′′ ∈ N such that for all m ≥ m′′,
|Πm1 (x)− Π1(x)| = |(cm1 )−1(u(x))− c−1(u(x))| < 
for all x ∈ [0, T¯ ], which establishes uniform convergence.
Now fix any  such that 0 <  < Π∞ and define Π˜ = Π∞ −  > 0. Hence there exists
m′′′ ∈ N such that for all m ≥ m′′′,
n∑
i=1
e¯mi ≥ ΠP (e¯m,Φm) ≥ Πm ≥ Π˜ > 0.
Define
cm = min
e∈E
n∑
i=1
cmi (ei) s.t.
n∑
i=1
ei = Π˜.
We then obtain that
∑n
i=1 c
m
i (e¯
m
i ) ≥ cm for all m ≥ m′′′. Similarly, define
c∞ = min
e∈E
n∑
i=1
c(ei) s.t.
n∑
i=1
ei = Π˜,
noting that c∞ > 0. It again follows from uniform convergence of cmi to c for each i ∈ I
that limm→∞ cm = c∞. Fix any ′ such that 0 < ′ < c∞ and define c = c∞ − ′ > 0. It
follows that there exists m′ ∈ N such that for all m ≥ m′,
n∑
i=1
cmi (e¯
m
i ) ≥ cm ≥ c,
which completes the proof. 
We can now combine Lemmas 14 and 15 to obtain the following result.
Lemma 16 There exists m ∈ N such that for all m ≥ m,
max
k∈I
cmk (e¯
m
k ) ≤
1
n− 1
n∑
i=1
cmi (e¯
m
i ).
Proof. By Lemma 15, there exist m′ ∈ N and c > 0 such that ∑ni=1 cmi (e¯mi ) ≥ c for all
m ≥ m′. In addition, from the limiting statement about κm in Lemma 14 we can conclude
that there exists m′′ ∈ N such that for all m ≥ m′′,
max
k∈I
cmk (e¯
m
k )−
1
n
n∑
i=1
cmi (e¯
m
i ) ≤
c
n(n− 1) .
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Thus for all m ≥ m = max{m′,m′′} we obtain
max
k∈I
cmk (e¯
m
k )−
1
n− 1
n∑
i=1
cmi (e¯
m
i ) = max
k∈I
cmk (e¯
m
k )−
1
n
n∑
i=1
cmi (e¯
m
i )−
1
n(n− 1)
n∑
i=1
cmi (e¯
m
i )
≤ c
n(n− 1) −
1
n(n− 1)
n∑
i=1
cmi (e¯
m
i )
≤ 0. 
Now consider the sequence for any m ≥ m as given in Lemma 16. Combined with
Lemma 10 we can conclude that
max
k∈I
cmk (e¯
m
k ) ≤ u
(
xm
n− 1
)
(10)
holds, where xm > 0 is the expected sum of transfers in contract Φm. We now claim that
there exists a contest Cmy which also implements e¯m and yields the same expected payoff
to the principal. Let the prize profile be given by
y =
(
xm
n− 1 , . . . ,
xm
n− 1 , 0
)
.
The allocation rule of Cmy is as follows. If e = e¯m, the zero prize is given to agent i with
probability pmi ≥ 0, while all other agents obtain one of the identical positive prizes. Below
we will determine the values pmi such that
∑n
i=1 p
m
i = 1. If e = (ei, e¯m−i) with ei 6= e¯mi for
some i ∈ I, the deviating agent i obtains the zero prize for sure and all other agents obtain
one of the identical positive prizes. For all other effort profiles e, the allocation of the prizes
can be chosen arbitrarily. Since Cmy is a contest, it is credible.
For each agent i ∈ I, first define p˜mi implicitly by
(1− p˜mi )u
(
xm
n− 1
)
= cmi (e¯
m
i ).
Since the LHS of this equation describes the expected payoff of agent i who expects to obtain
the zero prize with probability p˜mi , it follows that the contest Cmy indeed implements e¯m if
pmi ≤ p˜mi holds for all i ∈ I. The fact that cmi (e¯mi ) ≤ u(xm/(n− 1)) for all i ∈ I due to that
(10) guarantees p˜mi ≥ 0. Lemma 10 also implies that
n∑
i=1
cmi (e¯
m
i ) =
n∑
i=1
(1− p˜mi )u
(
xm
n− 1
)
=
(
n−
n∑
i=1
p˜mi
)
u
(
xm
n− 1
)
≤ (n− 1)u
(
xm
n− 1
)
,
which guarantees that
∑n
i=1 p˜
m
i ≥ 1. It is therefore possible to find equilibrium punishment
probabilities pmi such that 0 ≤ pmi ≤ p˜mi ∀i ∈ I and
∑n
i=1 p
m
i = 1. The principal’s expected
payoff is then
∑n
i=1 e¯
m
i − xm with both (e¯m,Φm) and (e¯m, Cmy ).
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In sum, for any m ≥ m, the principal can achieve a weakly higher payoff with a contest
than with any other contract. Hence it only remains to be shown that a solution to the
principal’s problem exists in the heterogeneous cost case. This will be established in the
proof of Proposition 5 below. 
B.7 Proof of Proposition 5
First, we characterize the set of all pure-strategy effort profiles which can be implemented.
Define
E1 =
{
e ∈ E |
n∑
i=1
ci(ei) ≤ (n− 1)u
(
T¯
n− 1
)}
,
E2 =
{
e ∈ E |
n∑
i=1
u−1(ci(ei)) ≤ T¯
}
.
The following result provides a necessary condition for implementability.
Lemma 17 A pure-strategy effort profile e¯ ∈ E can be implemented by some contract only
if e¯ ∈ E1 ∩ E2.
Proof. Suppose e¯ ∈ E is implemented by a contract Φ. By contradiction, assume first
that e¯ /∈ E1. Then ∑ni=1 ci(e¯i) > (n − 1)u(T¯/(n − 1)). By Lemma 10, it also holds
that
∑n
i=1 ci(e¯i) ≤ (n − 1)u (x/(n− 1)), where x is the expected sum of transfers in Φ.
Combining the two inequalities, we obtain x > T¯ . Hence Φ allocates transfer profiles
which are not feasible, a contradiction.
Suppose now that e¯ /∈ E2. From (IC-A) it is clear that ci(e¯i) ≤ Eµe¯ [u(ti)] ≤ u(Eµe¯ [ti])
must hold, and hence u−1(ci(e¯i)) ≤ Eµe¯ [ti], for all i ∈ I. Since e¯ /∈ E2, we then obtain
x =
∑n
i=1 Eµe¯ [ti] > T¯ , again a contradiction. 
We now restrict attention to effort profiles e¯ ∈ E1 ∩ E2, assuming without loss of
generality that ci(e¯i) ≥ cj(e¯j) if i < j. For any such profile, define x′ implicitly by
u
(
x′
n− 1
)
=
1
n− 1
n∑
i=1
ci(e¯i).
The fact that e¯ ∈ E1 implies that x′ is well-defined and satisfies x′ ≤ T¯ . Furthermore, for
each i ∈ I let x˜i = u−1(ci(ei)) and
x˜ =
n∑
i=1
x˜i,
which is well-defined and satisfies x˜ ≤ T¯ because e¯ ∈ E2.
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Lemma 18 If e¯ ∈ E1 ∩ E2, then e¯ can be implemented by a generalized contest with an
expected sum of transfers max{x′, x˜}.
Proof. Fix any e¯ ∈ E1 ∩ E2. We will construct a generalized contest that implements e¯
with an expected sum of transfers max{x′, x˜} ≤ T¯ . We examine two cases separately.
Case 1: x′ ≥ x˜. Define yd = (x′/(n − 1), . . . , x′/(n − 1), 0). This vector of prizes will
be used after any unilateral deviation from e¯, so that the deviator gets the zero prize while
all other agents get x′/(n− 1). Next, we construct the vector of prizes y that will be used
to reward the agents in equilibrium. For every  ∈ [0, x˜n], let
yn() = x˜n −  and yi() = x˜i + x
′ − x˜+ 
n− 1 ∀i < n.
By construction
∑n
i=1 yi() = x
′. In addition, we have
n∑
i=1
u(yi(0)) ≥
n∑
i=1
ci(e¯i) = (n− 1)u
(
x′
n− 1
)
≥
n∑
i=1
u(yi(x˜n)), (11)
where the first inequality follows from yi(0) ≥ x˜i for all i ∈ I, and the second inequality
follows from yn(x˜n) = 0,
∑n
i=1 yi(x˜n) = x
′, and the fact that u is concave. Since u is
continuous, (11) implies that there exists some ∗ ∈ [0, x˜n] such that
n∑
i=1
u(yi(
∗)) =
n∑
i=1
ci(e¯i) = (n− 1)u
(
x′
n− 1
)
. (12)
Let y = y(∗) = (y1(∗), ..., yn(∗)). It follows by construction that any contract which
allocates only permutations of the vectors y or yd is credible.
Since the transfer to a unilateral deviator from e¯ is zero, the only remaining step is to
show that there is a way to allocate the equilibrium prizes y such that the expected utility
of each agent i is at least ci(e¯i).
Consider the following n transfer vectors, each of which is a permutation of y. For all
i ∈ I, ti ∈ T is given by
tij =

yn(
∗) if j = i,
yi(
∗) if j = n,
yj(
∗) if j 6= i, n.
In words, in transfer vector tn each agent j receives the transfer yj(∗). For any i 6= n, the
transfer vector ti is the same as tn except that the transfers of agents i and n are swapped.
Next, we will construct the probabilities with which the transfer vectors ti are allocated in
equilibrium.
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If ∗ = 0, then we have u(yi(∗)) ≥ ci(e¯i) for all i ∈ I. In this case, we let the transfer
vector tn be allocated with probability one in equilibrium, so that the required expected
utility is achieved for each i ∈ I.
If ∗ > 0, then we have u(yi(∗)) > ci(e¯i) ≥ cn(e¯n) > u(yn(∗)) for all i < n. Hence, for
all i < n there exists a unique pi ∈ (0, 1) such that
piu(yn(
∗)) + (1− pi)u(yi(∗)) = ci(e¯i). (13)
In addition, we define pn = 1−∑n−1i=1 pi. To show that (p1, ..., pn) is a well-defined proba-
bility vector, we only need to establish pn ≥ 0. This property indeed holds because
n−1∑
i=1
pi =
n−1∑
i=1
u(yi(
∗))− ci(e¯i)
u(yi(∗))− u(yn(∗))
≤
n−1∑
i=1
u(yi(
∗))− ci(e¯i)
u(yn−1(∗))− u(yn(∗))
=
∑n
i=1 u(yi(
∗))− u(yn(∗))−
∑n−1
i=1 ci(e¯i)
u(yn−1(∗))− u(yn(∗))
=
∑n
i=1 ci(e¯i)− u(yn(∗))−
∑n−1
i=1 ci(e¯i)
u(yn−1(∗))− u(yn(∗))
=
cn(e¯n)− u(yn(∗))
u(yn−1(∗))− u(yn(∗))
< 1.
Now consider the allocation rule where each vector ti is allocated with probability pi.
With this rule, each agent i < n receives the prize yn(∗) with probability pi and the prize
yi(
∗) with the opposite probability 1 − pi. By (13), this yields an expected utility equal
exactly to ci(e¯i). As for agent n, he receives each prize yi(∗) with probability pi. Hence,
his expected utility is given by
n∑
i=1
piu(yi(
∗)) =
n−1∑
i=1
piu(yi(
∗)) +
(
1−
n−1∑
i=1
pi
)
u(yn(
∗))
=
n−1∑
i=1
pi [u(yi(
∗))− u(yn(∗))] + u(yn(∗))
=
n−1∑
i=1
[u(yi(
∗))− ci(e¯i)] + u(yn(∗))
=
n∑
i=1
u(yi(
∗))−
n−1∑
i=1
ci(e¯i)
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=
n∑
i=1
ci(e¯i)−
n−1∑
i=1
ci(e¯i)
= cn(e¯n),
where the third equality follows (13), and the fifth equality follows (12). Thus, agent n
also receives an expected utility exactly equal to his effort cost cn(e¯n). We can conclude
that the generalized contest implements e¯ with an expected sum of transfers x′.
Case 2: x′ < x˜. Let y = (x˜1, . . . , x˜n). Consider a generalized contest where in equi-
librium, when e = e¯, each agent i receives x˜i with probability one, and is thus exactly
compensated for the cost of effort.
Next, we construct the vector of prizes yd that will be used after unilateral deviations.
Note that (n−1)u(x˜/(n−1)) > (n−1)u(x′/(n−1)) = ∑ni=1 ci(e¯i). In addition, by concavity
of u and u(0) = 0 we have u(x˜) ≤∑ni=1 ui(x˜i) = ∑ni=1 ci(e¯i). But then by continuity of u
there must exist ε∗ ∈ (0, x˜
n−1
]
such that
(n− 2)u
(
x˜
n− 1 − ε
∗
)
+ u
(
x˜
n− 1 + (n− 2)ε
∗
)
=
n∑
i=1
ci(e¯i) = (n− 1)u
(
x′
n− 1
)
.
Now define
yd =
(
x˜
n− 1 + (n− 2)
∗,
x˜
n− 1 − ε
∗, . . . ,
x˜
n− 1 − 
∗, 0
)
.
Let the zero prize be allocated to a unilateral deviator from e¯, while the other prizes in
yd are allocated randomly among the remaining agents. By construction of y and yd, this
generalized contest is credible, and it follows immediately that it implements e¯, with an
expected sum of transfers x˜. 
Lemma 19 If a pure-strategy effort profile e¯ is implementable, then the lowest expected
sum of transfers at which it can be implemented is max{x′, x˜}.
Proof. First, observe that any contract implementing e¯ has to satisfy ci(e¯i) ≤ Eµe¯ [u(ti)] ≤
u(Eµe¯ [ti]) and hence x˜i = u−1(ci(e¯i)) ≤ Eµe¯ [ti] for all i ∈ I. Summing up over all i ∈ I
implies that x˜ ≤∑ni=1 Eµe¯ [ti], so that x˜ is a lower bound on the expected sum of transfers
in any contract implementing e¯.
When x′ < x˜, the construction given in Case 2 of the proof of Lemma 18 implements e¯
at exactly x˜, so the lower bound is reached.
When x′ ≥ x˜, the construction given in Case 1 of the proof of Lemma 18 implements e¯
at exactly x′. We claim that in this case x′ is in fact the lowest expected sum of transfers at
which e¯ can be implemented. Suppose by contradiction that there exists a contract which
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implements e¯ at x < x′. By Lemma 10 and the definition of x′, we have
u
(
x′
n− 1
)
=
1
n− 1
n∑
i=1
ci(e¯i) ≤ u
(
x
n− 1
)
,
which implies x ≥ x′, a contradiction. 
To complete the proof of Proposition 5, we finally establish the existence of a solution.
Lemma 20 An optimal contract exists.
Proof. First, observe that the set of implementable effort profiles E1 ∩ E2 is compact.
By Lemma 19, the minimum expected sum of transfers for implementing an effort profile
e ∈ E1 ∩ E2 is given by max{x′(e), x˜(e)}, where
x′(e) = (n− 1)u−1
(
1
n− 1
n∑
i=1
ci(ei)
)
and x˜(e) =
n∑
i=1
u−1(ci(ei))
are continuous functions of e. Thus, the principal’s problem can be reformulated as
max
e∈E1∩E2
[
n∑
i=1
ei −max{x′(e), x˜(e)}
]
,
which amounts to the maximization of a continuous function on a compact set. Hence a
solution exists.  
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